Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2’s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
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