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The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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  • Drew Fudenberg
  • David K. Levine
  • Eric Maskin

Abstract

We study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. We provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting. The central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that, for any two players, no two deviations—one by each player—give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes. The results apply to principal-agent, partnership, oligopoly, and mechanismdesign models, and to one-shot games with transferable utilities.
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Suggested Citation

  • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:394
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-1198, September.
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    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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