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Alp Enver Atakan

Personal Details

First Name:Alp
Middle Name:Enver
Last Name:Atakan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pat41
http://alpeatakan.weebly.com/
Terminal Degree:2003 Department of Economics; School of Arts and Sciences; Columbia University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

İktisat Bölümü
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi
Koç Üniversitesi

İstanbul, Turkey
http://case.ku.edu.tr/tr/econ/home

: (90+212)-338-1302
(90+212)-338-1393
Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sarıyer, 34450 İstanbul
RePEc:edi:dekoctr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2018. "Starting Small to Communicate," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1805, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  2. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  3. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2016. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," MPRA Paper 75632, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation," Discussion Papers 1553, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Alp E. Atakan, 2010. "Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1030, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  7. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets," Discussion Papers 1508, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputations with Long Run Players," 2009 Meeting Papers 220, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players," Discussion Papers 1510, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1506, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Alp Atakan, 2005. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," 2005 Meeting Papers 218, Society for Economic Dynamics.

Articles

  1. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
  2. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2014. "Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 1-29.
  3. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2014. "Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 2014-2048, July.
  4. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2013. "A two-sided reputation result with long-run players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 376-392.
  5. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
  6. Alp Atakan, 2008. "Bargaining: separately or together?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 295-319, February.
  7. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 667-680, May.
  8. Alp E. Atakan, 2003. "Stochastic convexity in dynamic programming," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 447-455, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2016. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," MPRA Paper 75632, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2017. "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1399-1429, June.

  2. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.

  3. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation," Discussion Papers 1553, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Chahrour, Ryan & Gaballo, Gaetano, 2017. "Learning from prices: amplication and business fluctuations," Working Paper Series 2053, European Central Bank.
    2. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    3. Raphael Boleslavsky & David L Kelly & Curtis R Taylor, 2013. "Selloffs, Bailouts, and Feedback: Can Asset Markets Inform Policy," Working Papers 2013-11, University of Miami, Department of Economics.

  4. Alp E. Atakan, 2010. "Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1030, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.

    Cited by:

    1. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information," Microeconomics.ca working papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-38-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 May 2007.
    2. Elliott, M. & Nava, F., 2017. "Decentralized Bargaining in Matching Markets: Efficient Stationary Equilibria and the Core," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1742, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Lauermann, Stephan, 2012. "Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: An inversion result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1969-1997.
    4. Stephan Lauermann, 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 663-689, April.
    5. Carlos Canon, 2011. "Matching & Information Provision by One-Sided and Two-Sided Platforms," Working Papers 11-20, NET Institute, revised Oct 2011.
    6. YIlmaz, Ensar, 2011. "Income distribution, efficiency and rationing," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1247-1255, May.
    7. Shneyerov, Artyom, 2014. "A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 314-317.
    8. Yilmaz, Ensar & Ünveren, Burak, 2011. "Income distribution and exchange in a dynamic search model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 665-678, October.
    9. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 435-467, July.

  5. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets," Discussion Papers 1508, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    2. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav, 2017. "Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 89-113.
    3. Selçuk Özyurt, 2015. "Searching for a Bargain: Power of Strategic Commitment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 320-353, February.
    4. Erik O. Kimbrough & Kevin Laughren & Roman Sheremeta, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," Discussion Papers dp17-10, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    5. Özyurt Selçuk, 2016. "Building Reputation in a War of Attrition Game: Hawkish or Dovish Stance?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 797-816, June.
    6. Anton Tsoy, 2016. "Liquidity and Prices in Decentralized Markets with Almost Public Information," 2016 Meeting Papers 8, Society for Economic Dynamics.

  6. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputations with Long Run Players," 2009 Meeting Papers 220, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
    3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2012. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 587, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.

  7. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players," Discussion Papers 1510, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    2. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    3. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
    4. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    7. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
    8. Harrington, Joseph E. & Zhao, Wei, 2012. "Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 277-289.
    9. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2012. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 587, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.

  8. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.

  9. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1506, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    2. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
    3. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
    4. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.

  10. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Long, Iain W., 2015. "Better feared than loved: Reputations and the motives for conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 46-61.
    2. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
    3. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    4. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
    5. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    6. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2016. "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Monash Economics Working Papers 21-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
    8. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
    9. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    11. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
    12. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
    13. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  11. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information," Microeconomics.ca working papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-38-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 May 2007.
    2. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Shneyerov, Art & Xie, Huan, 2010. "How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market," Microeconomics.ca working papers artyom_shneyerov-2010-32, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Oct 2010.
    4. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Matching and Bargaining Mechanism," Microeconomics.ca working papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-43-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 May 2007.
    5. Artyom Shneyerov & Adam Chi Leung Won, 2008. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1467, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Niedermayer, Andras & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2013. "For-Profit Search Platforms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 436, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 435-467, July.
    8. Stephan Lauermann, 2008. "When Less Information is Good for Efficiency: Private Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets," 2008 Meeting Papers 419, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Stephan Lauermann, 2008. "Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    10. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2016. "An optimistic search equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 89-114, June.

  12. Alp Atakan, 2005. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," 2005 Meeting Papers 218, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Coen Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2011. "Sorting and the output loss due to search frictions," 2011 Meeting Papers 169, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Jeremy Lise & Costas Meghir & Jean-Marc Robin, 2016. "Matching, Sorting, and Wages," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/78hlmdbud88, Sciences Po.
    3. Aloysius Siow, 2009. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Working Papers tecipa-356, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1205-1229, April.
    5. Jeremy Lise & Costas Meghir & Jean-Marc Robin, 2013. "Mismatch, sorting and wage dynamics," IFS Working Papers W13/16, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    6. Picchio, Matteo & van Ours, Jan, 2016. "Temporary Jobs and the Severity of Workplace Accidents," Discussion Paper 2016-028, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Poeschel, Friedrich, 2012. "Assortative matching through signals," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62061, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Francesco Palazzo, 2016. "Search costs and the severity of adverse selection," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1073, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Smeets, Valérie, 2006. "Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics," Working Papers 06-9, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    10. Bombardini, Matilde & Orefice, Gianluca & Tito, Maria D., 2015. "Does Exporting Improve Matching? Evidence from French Employer-Employee Data," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-113, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Pierre-André Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2016. "The marriage market, labour supply and education choice," IFS Working Papers W16/09, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    12. Gallemore, Caleb & Jespersen, Kristjan, 2016. "Transnational Markets for Sustainable Development Governance: The Case of REDD+," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 79-94.
    13. Tzuo Hann Law & Iourii Manovskii & Marcus Hagedorn, 2014. "Identifying Equilibrium Models of Labor Market Sorting," 2014 Meeting Papers 896, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. A. L. Booth & Melvyn Coles, 2005. "Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance," Working Papers 205, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    15. John Bone & John Hey & John Suckling, 2014. "What price compromise?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 359-376, October.
    16. Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2009. "Identifying Sorting: In Theory," IZA Discussion Papers 4004, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    17. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. Cristian Bartolucci & Francesco Devicienti & Ignacio Monzon, 2015. "Identifying Sorting in Practice," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 431, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    19. Coles, Melvyn, 2008. "Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 537-559, August.
    20. Cristian Bartolucci, 2013. "Gender Wage Gaps Reconsidered: A Structural Approach Using Matched Employer-Employee Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(4), pages 998-1034.
    21. Chen, Natalie & Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2011. "Multi-Trait Matching and Intergenerational Mobility: A Cinderella Story," CEPR Discussion Papers 8605, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Lentz, Rasmus, 2010. "Sorting by search intensity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1436-1452, July.
    23. Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Steady states in matching and bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 206-228.
    24. Fredriksson, Peter & Hensvik, Lena & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2015. "Mismatch of Talent Evidence on Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility," Research Papers in Economics 2015:10, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    25. Francesco Devicienti & Cristian Bartolucci, 2013. "Better Workers Move to Better Firms: A Simple Test to Identify Sorting," 2013 Meeting Papers 249, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    26. Douglas W. Allen & Shih En Lu, 2017. "Matching, marriage, and children: differences across sexual orientations," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 527-547, June.
    27. Carlos Canon, 2011. "Matching & Information Provision by One-Sided and Two-Sided Platforms," Working Papers 11-20, NET Institute, revised Oct 2011.
    28. Cristian Bartolucci & Ignacio Monzon, 2014. "Frictions Lead to Sorting: a Partnership Model with On-the-Match Search," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 385, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    29. Alessandro Tampieri, 2013. "Marriage Formation with Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem," CREA Discussion Paper Series 13-29, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    30. Xianwen Shi & Aloysius Siow, 2011. "Search Intermediaries," Working Papers tecipa-426, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    31. Leland D. Crane, 2014. "Firm Dynamics and Assortative Matching," Working Papers 14-25, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    32. Luca Paolo Merlino & Dario Pozzoli & Pierpaolo Parrotta, 2018. "Gender Differences in Sorting," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01687343, HAL.
    33. Jeremy Fox, 2016. "Estimating Matching Games with Transfers," CeMMAP working papers CWP14/16, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    34. Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    35. Chhabra, Meenal & Das, Sanmay & Sarne, David, 2014. "Expert-mediated sequential search," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 861-873.
    36. Xianwen Shi & Aloysius Siow, 2010. "Information Externalities and Intermediaries in Frictional Search Markets," Working Papers tecipa-398, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    37. Cebreros Zurita Carlos Alfonso, 2018. "Labor Heterogeneity and the Pattern of Trade," Working Papers 2018-01, Banco de México.
    38. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2012. "The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 1-21, February.
    39. Benjamin Lochner & Bastian Schulz, 2016. "Labor Market Sorting in Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 6066, CESifo Group Munich.
    40. Philipp Kircher & Jan Eeckhout, 2011. "Sorting and Factor Intensity: Production and Unemployment across Skills," 2011 Meeting Papers 792, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    41. Randall Wright, 2014. "Marriage, Markets and Money: A Coasian Theory of Household Formation," 2014 Meeting Papers 237, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    42. Levy, Matthew & Szentes, Balázs, 2016. "An alternative to signaling: directed search and substitution," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66148, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    43. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2013. "Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 143-156.
    44. Robin S. Lee & Michael Schwarz, 2009. "Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets," NBER Working Papers 14922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    45. GORYUNOV, Maxim, 2017. "Sorting when firms have size," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/09, European University Institute.
    46. Friedrich Poeschel, 2008. "Assortative matching through signals," Working Papers halshs-00585986, HAL.
    47. Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Bargaining in dynamic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 59-77.
    48. Ashish Arora & Michelle Gittelman & Sarah Kaplan & John Lynch & Will Mitchell & Nicolaj Siggelkow & Denisa Mindruta & Mahka Moeen & Rajshree Agarwal, 2016. "A two-sided matching approach for partner selection and assessing complementarities in partners' attributes in inter-firm alliances," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 206-231, January.
    49. Matthew Levy & Balázs Szentes, 2016. "An Alternative to Signaling: Directed Search and Substitution," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 1-15, November.

Articles

  1. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2014. "Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 1-29.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2014. "Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 2014-2048, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2013. "A two-sided reputation result with long-run players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 376-392.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Alp Atakan, 2008. "Bargaining: separately or together?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 295-319, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Montez, João, 2014. "One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 249-265.
    2. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Bargaining with Rent Seekers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 859-871, October.
    3. Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Tangsangasaksri, Supanit, 2011. "Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 55-64, July.
    4. Galasso, Alberto, 2010. "Over-confidence may reduce negotiation delay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 716-733, December.
    5. Dana, James D., 2012. "Buyer groups as strategic commitments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 470-485.

  7. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 667-680, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Alp E. Atakan, 2003. "Stochastic convexity in dynamic programming," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 447-455, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Tom Kompas & Pham Van Ha & R. Quentin Grafton, 2004. "Saving the Seas: The Economic Justification for Marine Reserves," International and Development Economics Working Papers idec04-3, International and Development Economics.
    2. R. Quentin Grafton & Tom Kompas & Pham Van Ha, 2006. "The Economic Payoffs from Marine Reserves: Resource Rents in a Stochastic Environment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(259), pages 469-480, December.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (6) 2007-04-09 2010-11-06 2011-02-05 2012-10-20 2014-03-22 2018-02-05. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2012-10-20 2014-03-22 2017-01-08 2017-01-15 2018-02-05. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2010-11-06 2010-11-06 2014-03-22
  4. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (2) 2014-03-22 2018-02-05

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