Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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- Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
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- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2018. "Observations on Cooperation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 2253-2282.
- Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
- Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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