Cooperation Without Enforcement? A comparative analysis of litigation and online reputation as quality assurance mechanisms
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- Robert Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2011.
"Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 273-285, May.
- Robert S. Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2008. "Remain Silent and Ye Shall Suffer: Seller Exploitation of Reticent Buyers in an Experimental Reputation System," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-22, Department of Economics, Williams College.
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- Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, 2004. "The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback," Working papers 4296-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006.
"Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
- MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Prüfer, Jens, 2018. "Trusting privacy in the cloud," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 52-67.
- Yabing Jiang & Hong Guo, 2012. "Design of Consumer Review Systems and Product Pricing," Working Papers 12-10, NET Institute.
- Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, 2003. "The Digitization of Word-of-mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms," Working papers 4296-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
More about this item
KeywordsOnline Reputation Mechanisms; Quality Assurance; Litigation; Internet; Game Theory; E-commerce; Information Technology;
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