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Trusting Privacy in the Cloud

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  • Prüfer, J.O.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

Cloud computing technologies have the potential to increase innovation and economic growth considerably. But many users worry that data in the cloud can be accessed by others, thereby damaging the data owner. Consequently, they do not use cloud technologies up to the efficient level. I design an institution that attenuates this problem. The scheme is built around a private, nonprofit organization called cloud association, which is governed by representatives of both cloud service providers and users, and which sources the actual auditing and certification tasks out to independent certifiers. I show how this institution incentivizes providers to produce high data security, and users to trust them and pay a premium for their services. The cloud association simultaneously solves providers’ adverse selection problem and certifiers’ moral hazard problem. By credibly implementing certified/not certified decisions, it drastically reduces the technological complexity faced by users, which boosts trust in cloud services.

Suggested Citation

  • Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Trusting Privacy in the Cloud," Discussion Paper 2014-073, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a9a71c30-19c3-466a-9d22-1760de3ad464
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cloud computing; privacy; data security; trust; associations; certification; Economic Governance; private ordering; market design;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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