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Business Associations and Private Ordering

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  • Prüfer, J.

    (Tilburg University, TILEC)

Abstract

We study the capacity of business associations—private, formal, noncommercial organizations designed to promote the common business interests of their members—to support contract enforcement and collective action. Inspired by recent empirical literature, our theoretical framework connects the organizational and institutional features of formal and informal business organizations with socioeconomic distance. We show how associations provide value to their members even if members are already embedded in social networks, and which players join an association. We propose explanations for empirical puzzles, put forward novel testable hypotheses, and relate business associations to alternative private ordering institutions. (JEL D02, D71, L14, L31).
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Suggested Citation

  • Prüfer, J., 2012. "Business Associations and Private Ordering," Discussion Paper 2012-011, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutil:8ac91d6c-9815-46b2-a83d-8e5351cc4746
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fiedler, Clemens & Larrain, Maria & Prüfer, Jens, 2023. "Membership, governance, and lobbying in standard-setting organizations," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(6).
    2. Prüfer, Jens, 2018. "Trusting privacy in the cloud," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 52-67.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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