Endogenous Enforcement Institutions
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- Gani Aldashev & Giorgio Zanarone, 2015. "Endogenous Enforcement Institutions," Working Papers ECARES 2015-38, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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More about this item
Keywords
Enforcement; Punishment; Coercive power; Relational contracts; State;JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2014-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2014-03-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GRO-2014-03-08 (Economic Growth)
- NEP-LAW-2014-03-08 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2014-03-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2014-03-08 (Regulation)
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