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Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability

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  • Ambrus, Attila
  • Greiner, Ben

Abstract

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally compare the institution of democratic punishment, where members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with individual peer-to-peer and dictatorial punishment institutions. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions. A comparison with dictatorial punishment suggests that the effect relative to traditional peer-to-peer punishment primarily works by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member's contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others.

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  • Ambrus, Attila & Greiner, Ben, 2019. "Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:178:y:2019:i:c:s0047272719301148
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kenju Kamei & Smriti Sharma & Matthew J. Walker, 2023. "Collective Sanction Enforcement: New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2023-014, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    3. Detemple, Julian & Kosfeld, Michael, 2023. "Fairness and Inequality in Institution Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 16464, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Edoardo Gallo & Yohanes E. Riyanto & Nilanjan Roy & Tat-How Teh, 2022. "Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic networks," Papers 2203.04001, arXiv.org.
    5. Gallo, Edoardo & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan & Teh, Tat-How, 2022. "Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 75-103.
    6. Thomas Markussen & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2023. "Is There a Dividend of Democracy? Experimental Evidence from Cooperation Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 10616, CESifo.
    7. Thomas Markussen & Louis Putterman & Liangjun Wang, 2023. "Algorithmic Leviathan or Individual Choice: Choosing Sanctioning Regimes in the Face of Observational Error," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(357), pages 315-338, January.
    8. Nicklisch, Andreas & Putterman, Louis & Thöni, Christian, 2021. "Trigger-happy or precisionist? On demand for monitoring in peer-based public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    9. Lippert, Steffen & Tremewan, James, 2021. "Pledge-and-review in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 179-195.
    10. José Gabriel Castillo & Zhicheng Phil Xu & Ping Zhang & Xianchen Zhu, 2021. "The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 385-419, February.
    11. Goeschl, Timo & Haberl, Beatrix & Soldà, Alice, 2023. "How to Organize Monitoring and Punishment: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0737, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public good contribution experiments; Punishment; Voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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