Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment - An experimental study
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- Attila Ambrus & Ben Greiner, 2012. "Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3317-3332, December.
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More about this item
Keywordspublic good contribution experiments; imperfect monitoring; welfare implications of costly punishment;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBE-2011-12-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-12-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-12-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-12-13 (Game Theory)
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