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Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments

  • Nikos Nikiforakis

A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower contributions and earnings compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contri- butions of their peers even though the feedback format does not a¤ect incentives. The data suggest that this is because the feedback format acts as a coordination device, which in?uences the contribution standards that groups establish

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Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 1036.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1036
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5355
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
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