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Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment

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  • Offerman, T.J.S.
  • Potters, J.J.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Sonnemans, J.

Abstract

We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments:mimicking the successful firm,following the exemplary firm, andbelief learning.Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments. Each of these treatments is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, dynamic rules, and outcomes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M. & Sonnemans, J., 2002. "Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment," Other publications TiSEM a6a771c5-31ba-4193-8f76-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a6a771c5-31ba-4193-8f76-a69928520be0
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
    2. Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
    3. Boylan Richard T. & El-Gamal Mahmoud A., 1993. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 205-222, April.
    4. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    5. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    6. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 329-353.
    7. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April.
    8. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 80-95, March.
    9. Pingle, Mark, 1995. "Imitation versus rationality: An experimental perspective on decision making," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 281-315.
    10. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
    11. Reinhard Selten & Michael Mitzkewitz & Gerald R. Uhlich, 1997. "Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 517-556, May.
    12. Andrew F. Daughety, 1985. "Reconsidering Cournot: The Cournot Equilibrium is Consistent," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 368-379, Autumn.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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