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Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation


  • George R. Neumann

    (University of Iowa)

  • Nathan E. Savin

    (University of Iowa)


Learning and communication play important roles in coordinating activities. Game theory and experiments have made a significant contribution to our understanding and appreciation for the issues surrounding learning and communication in coordination. However, the results of past experimental studies provide conflicting results about the performance of learning models. Moreover, the interaction between learning and communication has not been systematically investigated. Our long run objective is to overcome the conflicting results and to provide a better understanding of the interaction. To this end, we econometrically investigate a sender-receiver game environment where communication is necessary for coordination and learning is essential for communication.

Suggested Citation

  • George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1852, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1852

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2003. "An experiment on the value of structural information in a 2 x 2 repeated game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 27-32, January.
    2. Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes, 2000. "Estimating learning models from experimental data," Economics Working Papers 501, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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