Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation
Learning and communication play important roles in coordinating activities. Game theory and experiments have made a significant contribution to our understanding and appreciation for the issues surrounding learning and communication in coordination. However, the results of past experimental studies provide conflicting results about the performance of learning models. Moreover, the interaction between learning and communication has not been systematically investigated. Our long run objective is to overcome the conflicting results and to provide a better understanding of the interaction. To this end, we econometrically investigate a sender-receiver game environment where communication is necessary for coordination and learning is essential for communication.
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