Strategic Information Transmission
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References listed on IDEAS
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982.
"Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
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- Bengt Holmstrom, 1980. "On The Theory of Delegation," Discussion Papers 438, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
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- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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