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Learning in Sender-Receiver Games

Author

Listed:
  • DeJong, D.V.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Blume, A.
  • Neumann, G.

Abstract

Stimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model or neither of the models. Following Camerer and Ho, the models are also compared to a hybrid model that incorporates a mixture of both types of learning. The hybrid model is frequently not significantly better than either the SR or the BBL model. The sensitivity of the results to observations taken after learning has ceased is investigated.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1998-028, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:4a8b4f46-f30b-4ad2-bb0c-100779d25c4b
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; learning; testing;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General

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