Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality
On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction based on reciprocity and fairness, avoidance of circular concepts in step by step strategic reasoning, ex-post rationality and learning direction theory, presence of both adaptive and analytic approaches to repeated decision tasks, and the absence of quantitative expectations and optimization in typical repeated game strategies
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|Date of revision:||Nov 1997|
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- Ball, Sheryl B. & Bazerman, Max H. & Carroll, John S., 1991. "An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Keser, Claudia, 1997. "SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-24, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
- Selten,Reinhard & Mitzkewitz,Michael & Uhlich,Gerald, .
"Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
106, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Reinhard Selten & Michael Mitzkewitz & Gerald R. Uhlich, 1997. "Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 517-556, May.
- Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(2), pages 171-98.
- Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
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