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An Experiment on the Value of Structural Information in a 2x2 Repeated Game

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  • Atanasios Mitropoulos

    (University of Magdeburg)

Abstract

In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental study shows that the provision of a small amount of structural information prior to playing the game changes subject behaviour and significantly improves performance, even though standard adaptive learning rules do not take such information into account and optimal adaptive rules do not differ much between the two treatments. Our study calls for a more intense investigation into the cognitive processing of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2002. "An Experiment on the Value of Structural Information in a 2x2 Repeated Game," Game Theory and Information 0202002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202002
    Note: Type of Document - MS Word 2000; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 11; figures: 5 tables included
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1852, Econometric Society.
    2. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control," Game Theory and Information 0110003, EconWPA.
    3. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Discussion Paper 2000-09, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-272, March.
    5. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    6. Nick Feltovich & John Duffy, 1999. "Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 131-152.
    7. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study," Game Theory and Information 0110002, EconWPA.
    8. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2001. "Learning under minimal information: An experiment on mutual fate control," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 523-557, August.
    9. Eyal Sulganik & Itzhak Zilcha, 1996. "The value of information in the presence of futures markets," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(2), pages 227-240, April.
    10. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    11. Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2007. "A two-person game of information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 90-104, July.
    12. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
    13. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    repeated games; experiments; information; coordination;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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