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Learning in perturbed asymmetric games

  • Hofbauer, Josef
  • Hopkins, Ed

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest). Some applications of these results to stochastic learning models are given.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 52 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 133-152

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:52:y:2005:i:1:p:133-152
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  16. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
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  18. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 471, David K. Levine.
  19. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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