Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993.
"Learning Mixed Equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
- Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998.
"Learning in games,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998.
"Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.