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Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

  • Echenique, Federico
  • Edlin, Aaron

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 118 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 61-79

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:118:y:2004:i:1:p:61-79
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Echenique, Federico & Edlin, Aaron S., 2002. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt2b85c93d, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  3. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
  5. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Prescott, Edward C, 1992. "Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1387-406, November.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P, 1974. "Learning the Optimal Strategy in a Zero-Sum Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(5), pages 885-91, September.
  7. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
  8. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  11. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  12. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
  13. Crawford, Vincent P., 1985. "Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 69-78, March.
  14. Y. Kanivokski & P. Young, 2010. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 476, David K. Levine.
  15. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
  16. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
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