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Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions

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  • Beggs Alan

    () (University of Oxford)

Abstract

This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games with binary actions where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potential games. If there is a unique equilibrium, players' strategies converge almost surely to it. Even if there is not, in potential games and in the two-player case in supermodular games, any limit point of the learning process must be an equilibrium. In particular, if equilibria are isolated, the learning process converges to one of them almost surely.

Suggested Citation

  • Beggs Alan, 2009. "Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-30, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Berardi, 2011. "Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 157, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
    2. Christoph March, 2011. "Adaptive social learning," PSE Working Papers halshs-00572528, HAL.
    3. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2008. "Contagion through learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(4), December.
    4. Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2014. "Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (II): 2×2 games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 112-123.
    5. Berardi, Michele, 2015. "Learning and coordination with dispersed information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 19-33.
    6. Alan Beggs, 2015. "Learning in Monotone Bayesian Games," Economics Series Working Papers 737, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp324, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    8. Alan Beggs & A.W. Beggs, 2011. "Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games," Economics Series Working Papers 587, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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