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Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information

Author

Listed:
  • Camille Cornand

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frank Heinemann

    (TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin)

Abstract

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2009. "Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information," Post-Print halshs-01704266, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01704266
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01555.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    2. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
    3. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Silvia Sonderegger, 2010. "Centralized Or Decentralized Information: Which Is Better For Providing Incentives?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 290-305, April.
    5. Gonzalo Llosa & Vicente Tuesta & Marco Vega, 2006. "A BVAR Forecasting Model for Peruvian Inflation," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 117-141, July-Dece.
    6. Jean-Marc Tallon, 2006. "Incertitude stratégique et sélection d'équilibre : deux applications," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 6-6.
    7. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc, 2011. "Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 14-24, September.
    8. Kenneth Coates, 2006. "Measurement Problems in Household International Remittances," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 95-115, July-Dece.
    9. Isabelle Strauss-Kahn, 2006. "Secrecy in Foreign exchange Interventions: the Point of View of a Practitioner in a European Context," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 159-179, July-Dece.
    10. Trevor Campbell, 2006. "The Impact of Barbados’ Investment Climate on its Foreign Direct Investment Inflows," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 143-157, July-Dece.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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