Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of complete information , such as first price auctions, to have pure trategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a bidder's value for an object or a firm's marginal cost of production) , and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution which potentially allows for correlation between types.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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