Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2027

• Caggiano, Emanuele & d’Addona, Stefano & Maurici, Filippo & Vittori, Claudia, 2027, "From coast to cost: Mispricing and reform scenarios in Italy’s coastal concession system," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2026.108358.

2026

• Daniel Chen, 2026, "A Model of the Attention Economy: Data, Platforms, and Discovery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 10, pages 3802-3836, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240651.
• Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2026, "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 2, pages 535-581, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221345.
• Shani Cohen & Shengwu Li, 2026, "Sequential Cursed Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 3, pages 934-976, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230309.
• Noor Kumar & Uyseok Lee & Matt Lowe & Olaitan Ogunnote, 2026, "Internal versus Institutional Barriers to Gender Equality: Evidence from British Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 5, pages 1914-1953, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20241127.
• Karl M. Aspelund & Anna Russo, 2026, "Additionality and Asymmetric Information in Environmental Markets: Evidence from Conservation Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 8, pages 2765-2805, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20250295.
• Haruki Kono & Kota Saito & Alec Sandroni, 2026, "Random Utility with Unobservable Alternatives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 8, pages 2850-2882, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240712.
• Andreas Haupt & Zoë Hitzig, 2026, "Contextually Private Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 9, pages 3223-3262, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240579.
• Bruno Baránek & Leon Musolff & Vítězslav Titl, 2026, "Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 439-471, October, DOI: 10.1257/app.20240232.
• Larbi Alaoui & Antonio Penta, 2026, "Attitudes toward Success and Failure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 1, pages 105-145, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240429.
• Regina Seibel & Samuel Škoda, 2026, "Collusion by Exclusion in Public Procurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 3, pages 148-202, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240308.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Alexander Teytelboym, 2026, "The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 3, pages 244-284, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240208.
• Kun Zhang, 2026, "Optimal Procurement Design: A Reduced-Form Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 302-334, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20250128.
• Shanglyu Deng & Qiyao Zhou, 2026, "Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 36-71, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230303.
• Daniel Quint & Fuhito Kojima, 2026, "Symmetric Equilibrium in Pre-auction Investment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 377-414, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20250013.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai, 2026, "Screening Adaptive Cartels," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 3, pages 285-302, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20250233.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2026, "Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.17267, Jan.
• Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2026, "Endogenous shareholding auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.02457, Jul, revised Oct 2026.
• Jeffrey Gao & Adam Epp, 2026, "Auction Timing Under Limited Information: Evidence from Sovereign Bond Auctions," Staff Analytical Papers, Bank of Canada, number 2026-51, Oct, DOI: 10.34989/sap-2026-51.
• Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2026, "Participation Security and Elementary Mechanisms," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2026-126, Sep.
• Muhammed Ceesay, 2026, "Secret versus public rings in common value auctions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, volume 22, issue 1, pages 63-90, March, DOI: 10.1111/ijet.70008.
• Gaston Llanes & Martin Peitz, 2026, "The Long Tail Wags the Dog: Platform Design and Bargaining with Majors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2025_766, Jul.
• Lidia Vidal-Melia & Eva Camacho-Cuena & Till Requate & Israel Waichman, 2026, "Timing of Environmental Regulation and the Adoption of Low-Pollution Technologies: An Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 12539.
• Frank Stähler & Andrea Tulli, 2026, "The Costs and Benefits of Mediocrity: Endogenous Auction Design in Procurement," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 12970.
• Dan Kovenock & Jian Song & Francesco Trevisan, 2026, "Identity-dependent externalities can mitigate overbidding in Tullock contests: Theory and evidence," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 26-08.
• Ana María Patrón Piñerez, 2026, "The Cost of Pricing Rules in Electricity Auctions: A Neural Network Approach to Counterfactual Bayesian Nash Equilibria," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 2026-53, Oct.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2026, "Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21088, Jan.
• Pietola, Matias & Tarantino, Emanuele & Zenger, Hans, 2026, "Mergers, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Investment Channel," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21529, May.
• Cantillon, Estelle & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2026, "Competitive Tendering for Renewables and Industrial Decarbonisation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21628, Jun.
• Marra, Marleen & Miller, Nathan & Sileo, Gretchen, 2026, "The Commission Paradox: Evidence from Prison Telecommunications," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21635, Jun.
• Marra, Marleen & Oswald, Florian, 2026, "The Geography of Market Power: Firm Location, Spatial Rents, and Their Social Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21636, Jun.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Wang, Michael, 2026, "Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21665, Jun.
• Llanes, Gaston & Peitz, Martin, 2026, "The Long Tail Wags the Dog: Platform Design and Bargaining with Majors," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21684, Jun.
• Chiantello, Andrea & Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2026, "Matching in Vertical Markets: Evidence from the Digital Advertising Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 22077, Oct.
• Adrien Deschamps & François Maréchal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2026, "Environmental Criteria and Clauses in Public Procurement: Theory and Evidence on Their Effects on Bidder Participation," Working Papers, CRESE, number 2026-12, Oct.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2026, "Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2494, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Michael Wang, 2026, "Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2498, Mar.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Michael C. Wang, 2026, "Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2498R1, Jun.
• Leon Stolle & Jonas Boeschemeier & Benjamin F. Hobbs & Karsten Neuhoff, 2026, "Designing Hedging Instruments for Locational Price Risks – Lessons from North American Financial Transmission Rights," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2156.
• Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Liu, Lingzi & Zhang, Shuoxun & Zhao, Jingyi, 2026, "Does auction design facilitate collusion?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107389.
• Ma, Yongfan & Qi, Tiancheng, 2026, "Investor attention and art investment returns: The role of noise trading risk premium," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107393.
• Doosti, Hassan, 2026, "A copula-quantile density approach to affiliated private value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 261, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112837.
• Tumenjargal, Enkhbayar, 2026, "Uniqueness of equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112942.
• Chen, Ziwen, 2026, "State-dependent within-artist anchor reversal in ultra-contemporary art auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 267, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113079.
• Hanazono, Makoto & Sato, Susumu, 2026, "Compatibility and investment incentives in dynamic procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113129.
• Park, Yisang, 2026, "Calibrating bid screens under quantity repricing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113201.
• Chen, Jiawei & Nguyen, Anh & Shum, Matthew, 2026, "The winner’s bliss in common-value auctions under horizontal differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113252.
• Kline, Brendan, 2026, "Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 253, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2025.106104.
• Anundsen, André K. & Nenov, Plamen & Røed Larsen, Erling & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2026, "Pricing and incentives in the housing market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105213.
• Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2026, "Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: An equivalence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105256.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Fleck, Ann-Katrin & Ott, Marion, 2026, "A small volume reduction that melts down the market: Auctions with endogenous rationing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105436.
• Coles, Melvyn & Smith, Eric, 2026, "Bidding wars in the housing market: When directed search becomes stock-flow matching," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105455.
• Stevens, Nicolas & O’Neill, Richard & Papavasiliou, Anthony, 2026, "Average incremental cost pricing in electricity auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.109047.
• Cepeda, Valentina & Pérez, Juan F., 2026, "Deep-learning-based optimal auction design in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109176.
• Rottner, Claudio, 2026, "Watt’s better? Pay-as-bid vs. Uniform pricing in electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109284.
• Proz, Jeremy & Huber, Martin & Marin, Ivan, 2026, "Machine learning for detecting collusion and capacity withholding in wholesale electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109557.
• Wang, Runxi & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2026, "Designing renewable energy auctions for high realization probability — CfD and payment-only auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109584.
• Singer, Alexander, 2026, "Dealer competition in over-the-counter markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2025.101004.
• Hwang, Sung-Ha & Koh, Youngwoo & Baik, Sosung, 2026, "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 298-321, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.001.
• Ma, Zizhen & Riquelme, Nicolás, 2026, "Competitive limit of competing auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 367-382, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015.
• Hafalir, Isa & Kesten, Onur & Luo, Donglai & Sherstyuk, Katerina & Tao, Cong, 2026, "Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 63-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.013.
• Kovenock, Dan & Song, Jian & Trevisan, Francesco, 2026, "Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 691-716, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.003.
• Guan, Junyan & Yang, Jin, 2026, "Hassle costs in online auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103308.
• Büyükboyacı, Mürüvvet & Gunay, Hikmet & İntişah, Merve, 2026, "Bidding into bankruptcy: How auction order affects overbidding and losses," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 246, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107561.
• Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2026, "Market selection of strategic thinking types," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107690.
• Tukiainen, Janne & Soini, Vesa & Baulia, Susmita & Jääskeläinen, Jan, 2026, "Organizational culture and habit formation in public procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107727.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Zhao, Wenbo, 2026, "Intertemporal bundling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127.
• Lang, Xu & Yang, Zaifu, 2026, "Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106131.
• Hafalir, Isa & Kesten, Onur & Sherstyuk, Katerina & Tao, Cong, 2026, "When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106149.
• Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sogo, Takeharu, 2026, "Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106186.
• Paes Leme, Renato & Schneider, Jon & Zhang, Hanrui, 2026, "Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106187.
• Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Baranov, Oleg, 2026, "The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106192.
• Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2026, "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106216.
• Axelson, Ulf & Makarov, Igor, 2026, "Sequential credit markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104216.
• Biswas, Pratik & Sharma, Chandan, 2026, "Quantifying electricity market stress: Constructing and validating the stress index with evidence from India," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcomm.2026.100559.
• Stich, Lucas & Zeithammer, Robert & Spann, Martin & Häubl, Gerald, 2026, "Profitability of two-part tariffs in name-your-own-price markets," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, volume 102, issue 3, pages 735-756, DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2026.01.002.
• Doyle, Chris, 2026, "Strategic withholding in descending clock capacity auctions: A stage-by-stage analysis of the British electricity capacity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2026.102273.
• Pollitt, Michael G. & Duma, Daniel & Mitchell, Rona & Covatariu, Andrei, 2026, "Managing Great Britain's electricity distribution connection queue: lessons from auction theory and a potential position trading system," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2025.102099.
• Lima-Reyna, Jose L., 2026, "Competition in pay-as-bid auctions of divisible energy blocks: Theory and evidence from Chile," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2025.102136.
• Le, Toan, 2026, "AGV mechanism balances the budget with minimum total transfer variance," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103208.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2026, "A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103227.
• Yoo, Seung Han, 2026, "Membership mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103241.
• Gao, Mingrui & Chen, Xun & Wang, Dazhong, 2026, "Equity auctions with bidder moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103246.
• Geronikolaou, George, 2026, "Efficiency and equilibrium in discriminatory auctions with complementary items," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2026.101138.
• Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh & Agrawal, Ramesh Kumar, 2026, "Equilibrium bidding and expected revenue ranking when bidders have outside options," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2026.101140.
• Gao, Shenghao & Khezr, Peyman & Pourkhanali, Armin, 2026, "Pre-Announced Revenue Targets in Uniform-Price Auctions: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2026.104919.
• Shanks, Olga, 2026, "Price trends in sequential auctions: The case of collectible cars," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102518.
• Axelson, Ulf & Makarov, Igor, 2026, "Sequential credit markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 130383, Feb.
• Weinhold, Diana & Andersen, Lykke, 2026, "Adversarial procurement in two-value space: insights and evidence for conservation siting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 138837, Jun.
• Doyle, Christopher, 2026, "Strategic withholding in descending clock capacity auctions: a stage-by-stage analysis of the British electricity capacity market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 139055, Oct.
• Marina Núñez & Francisco Robles, 2026, "Marginalism and Stability in Package Allocation Problems and Market Replicas," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2026/498.
• Kai Wang & Ladislav Kristoufek, 2026, "Gas Fees as Liquidity Risk Signals in Blockchain Token Markets," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, number 2026/16, Jun, revised Jun 2026.
• Barış Kaymak, 2026, "Aggression of the Weak," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, number 26-27, Oct, DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202627.
• Muhammed Ceesay & Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2026, "Investments in First-Price and Second-Price Procurement Auctions," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_01.rdf.
• Federico INNOCENTI & Nicola DONI & Domenico MENICUCCI, 2026, "Information Design and Entry in Auctions," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_09.rdf.
• Nadine Chlaß, 2026, "Purely Procedural Preferences in Auctions, with a comment to: Equality of opportunity and the acceptability of outcome inequality," Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, number 2026-009, Jul.
• Jin Hyung Lee, 2026, "Competitive Bidding Strategy in an Auction with Random Cutoff - Randomness is Always Unpredictable?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 68, issue 3, pages 2199-2228, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-025-11087-9.
• Lidia Vidal-Meliá & Eva Camacho-Cuena & Till Requate & Israel Waichman, 2026, "Timing of Environmental Regulation and the Adoption of Low-Pollution Technologies: An Experiment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 89, issue 4, pages 1-29, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-026-01084-3.
• Matthias Florian Sahli & Alexander Cuntz, 2026, "Is there a premium for legacy artists? The death effect in exhibition shows and auction transactions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 50, issue 1, pages 1-34, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-025-09550-4.
• André K. Anundsen & Andreas Benedictow & Andreas E. Eriksen & Erling Røed Larsen & Mikkel Walbækken, 2026, "Repeat Bidder Behavior in Housing Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, volume 72, issue 4, pages 798-824, May, DOI: 10.1007/s11146-025-10038-3.
• Simha Mummalaneni, 2026, "Affirmative action as a cost cutting tool in procurement markets," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, volume 24, issue 1, pages 1-31, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11129-026-09305-1.
• Andrea Fazio & Erminia Florio & Gustavo Piga, 2026, "SMEs performance in public procurement and the Italian Legality Rating," Small Business Economics, Springer, volume 67, issue 3, pages 1929-1945, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11187-026-01259-8.
• Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2026, "Efficiency, strategy-proofness, and essentially quasi-linear preferences," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-21-008-v2, Jun.
• Dmitriy Knyazev & Elsa Pivard, 2026, "Contracts to Prevent Corruption in Auctions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 182, issue 2, pages 191-210, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2025-0032.
• Milena Wittwer & Jason Allen, 2026, "Market Power and Capital Constraints," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34645, Jan.
• Jason Allen & Ali Hortaçsu & Eric Richert & Milena Wittwer, 2026, "Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34646, Jan.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2026, "Estimating Demand Systems with Bidding Data," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34774, Jan.
• William N. Goetzmann & Dong Huang & Milad Nozari, 2026, "Non-Fungible Tokens as Investment," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34837, Feb.
• Alex Chan, 2026, "Buying a Station or Relaxing a Constraint? Spectrum Repacking and Dirac's Conjecture," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35757, Sep.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2026, "Soft Reserves, Learning and Bid Adjustment in Advertising Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35841, Oct.
• Xiaohong Chen & Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2026, "Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders and Selective Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 93, issue 1, pages 366-403.
• Josephine Auer & Lana Friesen & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2026, "A Secret Worth Keeping? Bid Cap Design in Budget-Constrained Procurement Auctions," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 672, Feb.
• Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Anselm Eicke & Lion Hirth & Fabian Ocker & Marion Ott & Ingmar Schlecht & Runxi Wang, 2026, "Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets," The Energy Journal, , volume 47, issue 1, pages 77-108, January, DOI: 10.1177/01956574251365606.
• James Hyungkwan Kim & Juan S. Giraldo & Paul V. Preckel & Andrew L. Liu & Douglas Gotham, 2026, "Welfare Impact of Virtual Trading on Wholesale Electricity Markets," The Energy Journal, , volume 47, issue 4, pages 1-23, July, DOI: 10.1177/01956574261421093.
• Tiago Botelho & Felipe Shalders, 2026, "Bidder Disclosure and Entry Deterrence in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2026_21, Aug.
• Satish Agarwal & Souvik Roy, 2026, "Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 362, issue 1, pages 483-492, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-026-07301-y.
• David Lander & Keer Li, 2026, "On the existence of equilibria with entry and trade in second-price auctions with a secret reserve price," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 1, pages 1-15, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-026-00306-7.
• Hikmet Günay & Xin Meng & Victor Perez, 2026, "Selling order in a sequential auction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 1, pages 1-26, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-026-00312-9.
• Hiroki Shinozaki & Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2026, "Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 81, issue 3, pages 865-906, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01670-4.
• Masahiro Kawasaki & Ryosuke Sakai & Tomoya Kazumura, 2026, "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 82, issue 1, pages 81-120, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01686-w.
• Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu & Yuxuan Zhu, 2026, "On the optimal design of all-pay auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 82, issue 2, pages 513-534, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-026-01704-5.
• Anastasia Antsygina, 2026, "Optimal allocation of multi-dimensional prizes in contests with heterogeneous agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 82, issue 2, pages 535-570, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-026-01707-2.
• Hiroki Shinozaki, 2026, "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 55, issue 1, pages 1-23, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00977-9.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2026, "An algorithmic analysis of parallel contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 55, issue 2, pages 1-24, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01008-x.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Valentina Peruzzi & Marilena Vecco, 2026, "Gender Inequality and Returns to Reputation in Art Markets," CIMEO Working Paper Series, Centre for Investigation and Modelling of Experimental Observations (CIMEO), number 196.
• Simon van Tartwijk, 2026, "Randomizing in Search Ad Auctions to Extract Revenue from Runaway Winners," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 26-075/VII, Sep.
• Ari Hyytinen & Jan Jääskeläinen & Antti Sieppi & Vesa-Heikki Soini & Janne Tukiainen, 2026, "Entry barriers in public procurement: Evidence from conjoint survey experiment," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 176, Feb.
• Janne Tukiainen & Vesa Soini & Susmita Baulia & Jan Jääskeläinen, 2026, "Organizational Culture and Habit Formation in Public Procurement," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 177, Feb.
• Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2026, "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-827, Sep.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2026, "Screening with Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 134, issue 2, pages 570-625, DOI: 10.1086/738342.
• Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2026, "Endogenous shareholding auctions," Working Papers, University of Windsor, Department of Economics, number 2603, Jul.
• Carril, Rodrigo, 2026, "Effizienz in der Verteidigungsbeschaffung: Best Practices für Europas Sicherheit," Kiel Reports, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 6.
• Carril, Rodrigo, 2026, "The biggest bang for the buck: Leveraging best practices in defence procurement for Europe's rearmament," Kiel Reports, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 6.
• Potarca, Matthias, 2026, "Auctions versus posted prices with costly entry and outside options," Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management, number 178.

2025

• Jaeok Park & Jinhyuk Lee & Chulyoung Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2025, "An Experimental Study of Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 181, issue 4, pages 656-696, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2025-0027.
• Paulo Santos & Benjamin Chipperfield & Shipra Shah, 2025, "Understanding the potential adoption of agroforestry in Fiji using procurement auctions," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 2025-07, May.
• Roberto Ercegovac & Tea Šestanović & Mario Pečarić, 2025, "ECB quantitative tightening: Euribor-Overnight Index Swap spread and transmission mechanism efficiency," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, volume 56, issue 2, pages 163-184.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2025, "The Benefits from Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33498, Feb.
• Justin Marion & Benjamin Rosa, 2025, "A Bid Strategy for Earlier Payment: Evidence and Implications of Front-End Loading in Procurement," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33606, Mar.
• Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2025, "Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33668, Apr.
• Mark van Oldeniel & Christopher M. Snyder & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2025, "Round Bidding in Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34564, Dec.
• Bo Cowgill & Zikai Xu, 2025, "Network Formation through Mechanism Design," Working Papers, NET Institute, number 25-01, Aug.
• Harold L Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2025, "Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 92, issue 1, pages 197-237.
• Kohnert, Dirk, 2025, "Seeding Growth: Unlocking the Potential of Agricultural Commodity Exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 125200, Jul.
• Kohnert, Dirk, 2025, "Semer la croissance: Libérer le potentiel des bourses de produits agricoles en Afrique subsaharienne
  [Seeding Growth: Unlocking the Potential of Agricultural Commodity Exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 125237, Jul.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2025, "Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 342, May.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Michel Tolksdorf, 2025, "Delegating in the Age of AI: Preferences for Decision Autonomy," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 558, Dec.
• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2025, "Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity," QM&ET Working Papers, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, number 25-01, Sep.
• Clara Calini & Alessandra Catenazzo & Elisabetta Iossa, 2025, "Using Multiple Tools to Enhance Competition in Public Procurement," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 594, Feb, revised 25 Feb 2025.
• Allan Davids, 2025, "Home Foreclosure Discounts in Auctions Without Reserve Prices: Evidence from Cape Town," ERSA Working Paper Series, Economic Research Southern Africa, number 144, May.
• Allan Davids, 2025, "Home Foreclosure Discounts in Auctions Without Reserve Prices: Evidence from Cape Town," ERSA Working Paper Series, Economic Research Southern Africa, number 228, Aug.
• Tomás Peruchín, 2025, "Shifting the Bidding Game: Reform of Auction Design for Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights in Argentina," Young Researchers Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, number 20, Nov, revised Nov 2025.
• Matthew O’Keefe, 2025, "Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions," The Energy Journal, , volume 46, issue 3, pages 103-122, May, DOI: 10.1177/01956574241303737.
• Karsten Neuhoff & Fernanda Ballesteros & Mats Kröger & Jörn C. Richstein, 2025, "Contracting Matters: Hedging Producers and Consumers With a Renewable Energy Pool," The Energy Journal, , volume 46, issue 4, pages 203-225, July, DOI: 10.1177/01956574251325486.
• Matteo Bizzarri, 2025, "General equilibrium with competition in schedules and input-output networks: an existence result," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 765, Oct.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Marco Gortan & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2025, "Swiss treasury bond auctions: An update," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2025-13.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2025, "The demand for safe assets," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2025-03.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Odilon Camara & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2025, "Advantage for Sale: Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2025_12, Sep.
• Chikako Ozu & Minoru Kunizaki, 2025, "How Can We Create a Public Platform for Art Prices?," Contributions to Economics, Springer, in: Calogero Guccio & Isidoro Mazza & Giacomo Pignataro, "New Perspectives in the Public and Cultural Sectors", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-81892-9_10.
• Takaaki Abe & Tsuyoshi Onda & Takehiko Yamato, 2025, "Second-price auctions with information acquisition costs," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 21-36, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00277-7.
• Gagan Ghosh & Bingchao Huangfu & Heng Liu, 2025, "Reserve prices in second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 69-77, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00281-x.
• Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti, 2025, "Optimal procurement auctions with audit," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 3, pages 993-1054, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01609-1.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2025, "Mimic martingales in sequential auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 4, pages 1283-1310, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01630-4.
• Hiroki Shinozaki, 2025, "Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 54, issue 2, pages 1-35, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00967-x.
• Heinz Herrmann & M. J. Cobo Martín, 2025, "Bidding for B2B or B2G tenders: toward the adoption of pricing models in practice," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 1495-1533, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-024-00424-1.
• Yangwei Song, 2025, "Robust auctions with affiliated private values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 2, pages 245-279, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0.
• Gregory Pavlov, 2025, "Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 3, pages 479-511, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00333-x.
• Doron Klunover, 2025, "First-price auction with a stochastic head start," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 4, pages 717-725, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00371-z.
• Johan Fourie & Tessa Hubble & Jonathan Schoots, 2025, "The price of status: Findings from Cape auctions," Working Papers, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics, number 03/2025.
• Sander Onderstal & Ruben van Oosten, 2025, "Vertical Integration in Auction Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 25-046/VII, Aug.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2025, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-799, Apr.
• Gagnepain, Philippe & Martimort, David, 2025, "Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1631, Mar.
• Rey, Patrick & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie, 2025, "All-receive procurement auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1637, Apr.
• Holmberg, Pär & Ruddell, Keith & Willems, Bert, 2025, "Multi-Product Supply Function Equilibria," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1669, Sep.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2025, "Corruption and renegotiation in procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1906, May.
• Atayev Atabek & Caspari Gian & Hillenbrand Adrian & Klein Thilo, 2025, "Mit Ungeduld zu besseren Subventionen für umweltfreundliche Produkte," Wirtschaftsdienst, Paradigm, volume 105, issue 6, pages 466-470, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2025-0117.
• Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2025, "Auctioning Control and Cash‐Flow Rights Separately," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 93, issue 3, pages 859-889, May, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21343.
• Harold Glenn A. Valera & Takashi Yamano & Ranjitha Puskur & Ronald Jeremy Antonio & Muhammad Ashraful Habib & M. D. Khairul Bashar & Valerien O. Pede, 2025, "The Impact of Micronutrient Training on High-Zinc Rice Demand Among Mothers: A Randomized Control Trial Study in Bangladesh," Asian Development Review (ADR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 42, issue 01, pages 209-232, DOI: 10.1142/S0116110525500088.
• Linnenbrink, Daniel, 2025, "Pay-as-bid Auctions with Private Information," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 325443, revised 2025.
• Bos, Olivier & Fugger, Nicolas & Onderstal, Sander, 2025, "Profit-share auctions in procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-038.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Kokott, Gian-Marco & Riehm, Tobias, 2025, "Auctions vs. negotiations: The role of communication in an experiment with procurement managers," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-039.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2025, "Congestion management games in electricity markets," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-044.
• David Dillenberger & Uzi Segal, 2025, "Allocation Mechanisms with Mixture-Averse Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 115, issue 12, pages 4523-4547, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240339.
• Ulrich Doraszelski & Katja Seim & Michael Sinkinson & Peichun Wang, 2025, "Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 115, issue 3, pages 903-944, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20162018.
• Julien Martin & Martin Pesendorfer & Jack Shannon, 2025, "Underbidding for Oil and Gas Tracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 115, issue 8, pages 2755-2780, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231356.
• Federico Echenique & Matías Núñez, 2025, "Price and Choose," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 2, pages 1-27, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230095.
• Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2025, "Complementary Bidding and the Collusive Arrangement: Evidence from an Antitrust Investigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 2, pages 66-93, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210450.
• Erik Brynjolfsson & Avinash Collis & Daniel Deisenroth & Haritz Garro & Daley Kutzman & Asad Liaqat & Nils Wernerfelt, 2025, "The Consumer Welfare Effects of Online Ads: Evidence from a Nine-Year Experiment," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 7, issue 4, pages 447-462, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20240452.
• Gabrielli Maria Florencia & Aryal Gaurab & Fajnzilber Eduardo & Willington Manuel, 2025, "Auctioning Annuities with Two Sided Private Information," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, number 4804, Dec.
• Peruchin Tomas Francisco, 2025, "Shifting the Bidding Game: Reform of Auction Design for Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights in Argentina," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, number 4827, Dec.
• Viktor Mitevski, 2025, "Market Competition In Public Procurement Of North Macedonia (2021–2025): Economic Analysis Of Bidders Per Tender," Proceedings of the International Conference "Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future", Faculty of Economics-Skopje, Ss Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, number 009, Dec.
• Adam Epp & Jeffrey Gao, 2025, "Are Hedge Funds a Hedge for Increasing Government Debt Issuance?," Discussion Papers, Bank of Canada, number 2025-07, May, DOI: 10.34989/sdp-2025-7.
• Adam Epp & Jeffrey Gao, 2025, "Les fonds de couverture : un filet pour l’augmentation des émissions d’obligations du gouvernement?," Discussion Papers, Bank of Canada, number 2025-07fr, May, DOI: 10.34989/sdp-2025-7.
• Phoebe Tian & Yu Zhu, 2025, "Liquidation Mechanisms and Price Impacts in DeFi," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 25-12, Mar, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2025-12.
• Adam Epp & Jeffrey Gao, 2025, "The increasing role of hedge funds in Government of Canada bond auctions," Staff Analytical Notes, Bank of Canada, number 2025-22, Oct, DOI: 10.34989/san-2025-22.
• Adam Epp & Jeffrey Gao, 2025, "Le rôle croissant des fonds de couverture dans les adjudications d’obligations du gouvernement du Canada," Staff Analytical Notes, Bank of Canada, number 2025-22fr, Oct, DOI: 10.34989/san-2025-22.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2025, "Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1492, May.
• Aner Sela, 2025, "Elimination contests with long-run efforts," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2508.
• Aner Sela, 2025, "Contests with Prize Contracts," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2509.
• Aner Sela & Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi, 2025, "Admission Policies in Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2510.