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Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes
Top JEL
/ D: Microeconomics
/ / D4: Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
/ / / D44: Auctions
- Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009, "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-33, July, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1522.
- Menicucci Domenico, 2009, "Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1600.
- Maréchal François & Morand Pierre-Henri, 2009, "Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-24, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1552.
- Rodriguez Gustavo E, 2009, "Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-35, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1534.
- Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2006, "Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-24, November, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1261.
- Ye Lixin, 2004, "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-29, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1158.
- Hon-Snir Shlomit, 2005, "Utility Equivalence in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-13, February, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1197.
- Lopomo Giuseppe & Marshall Robert C. & Marx Leslie M, 2005, "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-28, June, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1156.
- Parreiras Sergio O., 2006, "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-21, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1304.
- Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002, "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-44, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1019.
- Feinberg Yossi & Tennenholtz Moshe, 2005, "Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-12, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1061.
- Brisset Karine & Naegelen Florence, 2006, "Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-19, April, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1260.
- Nicoletta Marinelli & Giulio Palomba, 2009, "A Model for Pricing the Italian Contemporary Art Paintings at Auction," EHUCHAPS, Universidad del País Vasco - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, chapter 7, in: Ignacio Díaz-Emparanza & Petr Mariel & María Victoria Esteban, "Econometrics with gretl. Proceedings of the gretl Conference 2009".
- Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, None, "Methods of privatization: Auctions, bargaining, and giveaways," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.