Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1994

• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1994, "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 924, Mar.
• Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994, "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 55, issue 2, pages 203-231, October.
• Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994, "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 20039.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994, "Auctions vs. Negotiations," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 4608, Jan.
• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1994, "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 102, issue 1, pages 1-23, February, DOI: 10.1086/261919.

1993

• Kenneth Hendrix, 1993, "Optimal Selling Strategies for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Buyer," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1038, Mar.
• Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993, "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 40, issue 3, pages 485-511, September.
• Sinn, Hans-Wener & Demougin, Dominique, 1993, "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 743, Jan.

1992

• Hans-Werner Sinn & Dominique Demougin, 1992, "Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 16.
• Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992, "Privatization, Risk-Taking and the Communist Firm," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9216, Oct.
• Pagano, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1992, "Auction and dealership markets : What is the difference?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 2-3, pages 613-623, April.
• Gács, János & Karimov, Il'dar & Schneider, Christoph, 1992, "Small Scale Privatization in Eastern Europe and Russia from a Historical and Comparative Perspective," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 60799, Sep.
• John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2010, "Procurement when price and quality matter," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/99378.

1991

• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1991, "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," NBER Technical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 0112, Sep.
• Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Alan, 1991, "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 7, issue 1, pages 27-53, Spring.
• Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, 1991, "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 91jleo, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1991, "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 81, issue 1, pages 362-369, March.
• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1991, "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 593, Oct.
• Pagano, Marco & Röell, Ailsa, 1991, "Auction and dealership markets: what is the difference?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119185, Sep.
• Ailsa Röell & Marco Pagano, 1991, "Auction and Dealership Markets: What is the Difference?," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp125, Sep.

1988

• Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013, "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1017.

1987

• Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1987, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 87econ, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 55, issue 3, pages 615-632, May.

1986

• Hirschel Kasper, 1986, "On Understanding the Rise in Non-Tenure Track Appointments," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 591, Aug.

1985

• Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1985, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 406, Nov.

0

• Bo Chen & Marco Serena & Zijia Wang, 2023, "Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Affiliation," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2023-05, Mar.
• Kai Flinkerbusch, undated, "A more efficient procurement mechanism for reserve capacity in the German market for balancing power," Working Papers, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary, number 201178.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Jun Nakabayashi & Kei Kawai, 2022, "Screening Adaptive Cartels," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2022-23, Jun.
• Le, Phuong, 2018, "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2019, "On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Safronov, Mikhail, 2018, "Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020, "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 2, May.
• Auster, Sarah & Gottardi, Piero, 2019, "Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 3, July.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020, "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020, "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Janssen, Maarten & Kasberger, Bernhard, 2019, "On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke & Nichifor, Alexandru & Ostrovsky, Michael & Westkamp, Alexander, 2019, "Full substitutability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Baisa, Brian, 2020, "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020, "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020, "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 4, November.
• Rosato, Antonio, 2023, "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Zhang, Mengxi, 2024, "Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2023, "On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022, "When Walras meets Vickrey," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024, "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2023, "Equilibrium existence in games with ties," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Betto, Maria & Thomas, Matthew W., 2024, "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Deng, Shanglyu & Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2024, "Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari, 2024, "Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Jehiel, Philippe & Mierendorff, Konrad, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 4, November.
• Finster, Simon & Goldberg, Paul W. & Lock, Edwin, 2025, "Competitive and revenue-optimal pricing with budgets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
• Ball, Ian & Pekkarinen, Teemu, 0, "Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum & Juan-José Ganuza, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, number 2021_09, Jul.
• Rubens Morita & Zacharias Psaradakis & Martín Sola & Patricio Yunis, 2022, "On Testing for Bubbles During Hyperinflations," Department of Economics Working Papers, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, number 2022_02, Feb.
• Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, undated, "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study," Working Papers, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics, number 0803.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick & Waterson, Michael, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1188.
• Kirchler, Erich & Maciejovsky, Boris & Weber, Martin, 0, "Framing Effects on Asset Markets - An Experimental Analysis -," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 01-09, 00.
• Jack Robles & Makoto Shimoji, undated, "On Rationalizable Outcomes in Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 09/21.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2023, "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 23/02, Feb.
• Ricardo Gonçalves, undated, "An Ascending Auction in the Presence of Rationality and Herd Behaviour," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 99/8.
• Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, undated, "Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2003-4.
• Hector Chade & Jorge Aseff, undated, "An Optimal Auction with Identity-Dependent Externalities," Working Papers, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, number 2133477.
• Phoebe Koundouri & Andreas Drichoutis & Kyriaki Remoundou, undated, "Isolating Warm Glow in Charitable Auction Giving: A Comparison between Student and Non-student Subject Pools," DEOS Working Papers, Athens University of Economics and Business, number 1222.
• Anna Pechan & Gert Brunekreeft & Martin Palovic, undated, "Increasing resilience of electricity networks: Auctioning of priority supply to minimize outage costs," Bremen Energy Working Papers, Bremen Energy Research, number 0045.
• Theodosios DIMOPOULOS & Stefano SACCHETTO, 2011, "Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 11-47, Oct.
• Ichiro Obara, undated, "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 374.
• Burton Hollifield & Robert Miller & Patrik Sandas, undated, "Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number -290183991.
• Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, undated, "Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2012-E23.
• Hafalir Isa & Kurnaz Musab, undated, "Discriminatory Auctions with Resale," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2015-E12.
• Shyam Sunder & Karim Jamal, undated, "Why do Biased Heuristics Approximate Bayes Rule in Double Auctions?," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1999-23.
• Theodosios Dimopoulos & Stefano Sacchetto, 2014, "Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2012-E46, Dec.
• BAUWENS, Luc & GINSBURGH, Victor, 2000, "Art experts and auctions are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1485, Jan.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1596, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00081.
• ELLEFLAMME, Paul & BLOCH, Francis, 2004, "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1711, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00130.x.
• JEHIEL, Philippe & THISSE, Jacques-François, 2005, "How to win a decision in a confederation," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1781, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.001.
• d’ASPREMONT, CLaude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2005, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1974, Jan.
• Jozsef Sakovics & Lluis Bru & Daniel Cardona, 2018, "Block sourcing," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 287, Jun.
• Ahmed Anwar, 2002, "Affiliation in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 58, Jun.
• Sela, Aner, 2023, "Effort maximization in contests under balance constraints," Sports Economics Review, Elsevier, volume 1, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.serev.2022.100004.
• Cramton, Peter & Ingraham, Allan T. & Singer, Hal J., 0, "The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 32, issue 3-4, pages 273-290, April.
• Werner Güth & Maria Vittoria Levati & Andreas Stiehler, undated, "Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2002-01.
• Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, undated, "Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2002-36.
• Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, undated, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 18-98.
• Burton Hollifield & Robert A. Miller & patrik Sandas, undated, "An Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 29-99.
• Kaplan, Todd & Wettstein, David, undated, "The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2010/6, revised 22 Nov 2010.
• Rachmilevitch, Shiran, undated, "Bribing in second-price auctions," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2011/7.
• Rachmilevitch, Shiran, undated, "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2011/9.
• Benyamin Shitovitz & Diego Moreno, undated, "The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2017/7.
• Matthias Sutter & Martin Kocher & Sabine Strauß, undated, "Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2007-23.
• John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, undated, "Simple Reputation Systems," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 05-21, revised Nov 2005.
• Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2020, "When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-21-008, Jan.
• Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2024, "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-23-007-v2, Apr.
• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, undated, "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, number 20/07.

None

• Elbittar Alexander & Gomberg Andrei & Sour Laura, 2011, "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 11, issue 1, pages 1-33, August, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2631.
• Mares Vlad & Shor Mikhael, 2012, "On the Competitive Effects of Bidding Syndicates," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-33, September, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1682.2398.
• Eaton David H, 2007, "The Impact of Reputation Timing and Source on Auction Outcomes," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-14, July, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1646.
• Zheng Charles Zhoucheng, 2009, "The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-11, May, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2272.
• Gavious Arieh, 2009, "Separating Equilibria in Public Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, September, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2183.
• Lusk Jayson L & Schroeder Ted C., 2006, "Auction Bids and Shopping Choices," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-39, August, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1539.
• Hossain Tanjim & Morgan John, 2006, "...Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 2, pages 1-30, January, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1429.
• Katkar Rama & Reiley David H, 2007, "Public versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokémon Field Experiment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 2, pages 1-25, January, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1442.
• Cramton Peter & Schwartz Jesse A, 2002, "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-20, December, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1078.
• Morgan John & Steiglitz Ken & Reis George, 2003, "The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 2, issue 1, pages 1-25, April, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1102.
• Brocas Isabelle, 2006, "Designing Auctions in R&D: Optimal Licensing of an Innovation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-41, August, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1533.
• Julien Benoit & Kennes John & King Ian Paul, 2001, "Auctions and Posted Prices in Directed Search Equilibrium," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-16, July, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5998.1024.
• Ashlagi Itai & Braverman Mark & Hassidim Avinatan & Lavi Ron & Tennenholtz Moshe, 2010, "Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 10, issue 1, pages 1-32, May, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1648.
• Yoon Kiho, 2010, "Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 10, issue 1, pages 1-11, July, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1649.
• Robles Jack & Shimoji Makoto, 2012, "On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-21, May, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1829.
• Azrieli Yaron & Levin Dan, 2012, "Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-11, May, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1880.
• Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc, 2012, "An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-28, January, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1608.
• LI Daniel Zhiyun, 2012, "Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-31, March, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1709.
• Anwar Ahmed W, 2007, "Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-18, January, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1327.
• Hopkins Ed & Kornienko Tatiana, 2007, "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-25, May, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1366.
• Chouinard Hayley H & Yoder Jonathan K, 2007, "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-15, June, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1332.
• Burguet Roberto & Perry Martin K, 2007, "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-27, June, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1219.
• Cohen Chen & Sela Aner, 2007, "Contests with Ties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-18, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1398.
• Kirkegaard Rene, 2008, "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-32, September, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1417.
• Wellman Michael P & Osepayshvili Anna & MacKie-Mason Jeffrey K & Reeves Daniel, 2008, "Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-43, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1461.
• Obara Ichiro, 2008, "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-28, March, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1399.
• Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009, "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-33, July, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1522.
• Menicucci Domenico, 2009, "Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1600.
• Maréchal François & Morand Pierre-Henri, 2009, "Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-24, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1552.
• Rodriguez Gustavo E, 2009, "Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-35, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1534.
• Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2006, "Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-24, November, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1261.
• Ye Lixin, 2004, "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-29, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1158.
• Hon-Snir Shlomit, 2005, "Utility Equivalence in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-13, February, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1197.
• Lopomo Giuseppe & Marshall Robert C. & Marx Leslie M, 2005, "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-28, June, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1156.
• Parreiras Sergio O., 2006, "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-21, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1304.
• Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002, "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-44, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1019.
• Feinberg Yossi & Tennenholtz Moshe, 2005, "Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-12, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1061.
• Brisset Karine & Naegelen Florence, 2006, "Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-19, April, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1260.
• Nicoletta Marinelli & Giulio Palomba, 2009, "A Model for Pricing the Italian Contemporary Art Paintings at Auction," EHUCHAPS, Universidad del País Vasco - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, chapter 7, in: Ignacio Díaz-Emparanza & Petr Mariel & María Victoria Esteban, "Econometrics with gretl. Proceedings of the gretl Conference 2009".