Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2019

• Requate, Tilman & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Ch'ng, Kean Siang & Waichman, Israel, 2019, "Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work," KCG Working Papers, Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG), number 18.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Grebe, Tim & Kröger, Sabine, 2019, "How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 203606.
• Ott, Marion, 2019, "Simple Bayesian and Ex-Post Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 203616.
• Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes, 2019, "Games played through agents in the laboratory: A test of Prat & Rustichini's model," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, number SP II 2016-305r2, revised 2019.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019, "Obviousness around the clock," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, number SP II 2019-203.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019, "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-040.
• de Leverano, Adriano, 2019, "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-053.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Giuffrida, Leonardo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019, "Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-057.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Riehm, Tobias, 2019, "Procurement design with loss averse bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-060.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2019, "How the auction design influences procurement prices: An experiment," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-061.
• Gillen, Philippe, 2019, "Commitment in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-062.
• Andreas Hefti & Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz, 2019, "Market power and information effects in a multi-unit auction," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 320, Mar.

2018

• Paul R. Milgrom & Steven Tadelis, 2018, "How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24282, Feb.
• Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney & Caio Waisman, 2018, "The Simple Empirics of Optimal Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24698, Jun.
• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2018, "A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24890, Aug.
• Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen, 2018, "Dynamics and Efficiency in Decentralized Online Auction Markets," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25002, Sep.
• Gaivoronskaia, E. & Tsyplakov, A., 2018, "Using a Modified Erev-Roth Algorithm in an Agent-Based Electricity Market Model," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, volume 39, issue 3, pages 55-83.
• Gentry, Matthew L. & Hubbard, Timothy P. & Nekipelov, Denis & Paarsch, Harry J., 2018, "Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review," Foundations and Trends(R) in Econometrics, now publishers, volume 9, issue 2-4, pages 79-302, April, DOI: 10.1561/0800000031.
• Paul Klemperer, 2018, "Product-Mix Auction," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2018-W07, Dec.
• Ronald Peeters & Anastas P. Tenev, 2018, "Number of bidders and the winner’s curse," Working Papers, University of Otago, Department of Economics, number 1802, Jan, revised Jan 2018.
• Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Jean-Fran�ois Gauthier & Art Shneyerov, 2018, "Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 34, issue 3, pages 301-363.
• Albert H Choi & Eric Talley, 2018, "Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 34, issue 4, pages 543-578.
• Ahmed, Rafayal, 2018, "Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118463, Apr.
• Yokote, Koji, 2018, "The discrete Kuhn-Tucker theorem and its application to auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 83811, Jan.
• Morone, Andrea & Nemore, Francesco & Nuzzo, Simone, 2018, "Experimental Evidence on Tax Salience and Tax Incidence," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 85044, Mar.
• Vassilopoulos, Achilleas & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo, 2018, "Loss Aversion, Expectations and Anchoring in the BDM Mechanism," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 85635, Mar.
• Canavari, Maurizio & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Lusk, Jayson L. & Nayga, Rodolfo, 2018, "How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 89715, Oct.
• Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2018, "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 90052, Feb.
• Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Jean-Francois Gauthier & Art Shneyerov, 2018, "Bid Rigging And Entry Deterrence In Public Procurement: Evidence From An Investigation Into Collusion And Corruption In Quebec," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1401, Feb.
• Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018, "An efficient and implementable auction for environmental rights," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 587, Feb.
• Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018, "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 601, Nov.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018, "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 133, Dec.
• Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2018, "How Do Sellers Benefit From Buy-It-Now Prices in Ebay Auctions? -- an Experimental Investigation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 97, May.
• Pietro Bonaldi & Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas, 2018, "An Auction-Based Test of Private Information in an Interdealer FX Market," Working papers, Red Investigadores de Economía, number 1, Aug.
• Nikita Petrov & Tatiana Ratnikova, 2018, "Analysis of the joint distribution of stock and art indices: Attempt of a copular approach," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), volume 52, pages 46-61.
• Johannes Viehmann & Stefan Lorenczik & Raimund Malischek, 2018, "Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: an agent-based Q-learning approach," EWI Working Papers, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI), number 2018-3, Dec.
• Bernardo X. Fernández & Vladimir Fernández Q & E. René Aldazosa, 2018, "Una subasta doble de divisas para la determinación del tipo de cambio en Bolivia," Revista Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Economico, Carrera de Economía de la Universidad Católica Boliviana (UCB), issue 29, pages 152-189.
• Jannett Highfill & Kevin M. O’Brien, 2018, "eBay Memorabilia Auctions vis-à -vis Predictions for the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election," The American Economist, Sage Publications, volume 63, issue 1, pages 71-78, March, DOI: 10.1177/0569434517739298.
• Michael Grubb & David Newbery, 2018, "UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition:Emerging Lessons," The Energy Journal, , volume 39, issue 6, pages 1-26, November, DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.6.mgru.
• Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2018, "Auctions with Limited Liability through Default or Resale," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 494, Mar.
• Syngjoo Choi & Jos¢¥e-Alberto Guerra & Jinwoo Kim, 2018, "Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University, number no114, Sep.
• Fabian Ocker, 2018, "“Bid more, pay less” – overbidding and the Bidder’s curse in teleshopping auctions," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 28, issue 4, pages 491-508, November, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-018-0295-4.
• Sofia Lundberg & Per-Olov Marklund, 2018, "Green public procurement and multiple environmental objectives," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 45, issue 1, pages 37-53, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-017-0085-6.
• Riccardo Camboni Marchi Adani, 2018, "Procuring price and quality using scoring auctions: where do we stand?," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 45, issue 1, pages 17-36, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-017-0088-3.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018, "Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 69, issue 4, pages 363-373, December, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12176.
• Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2018, "Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 2, pages 231-249, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1028-6.
• Leonardo Rezende, 2018, "Mid-auction information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 751-780, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1038-z.
• Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2018, "Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 781-817, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1039-y.
• Yunjian Xu & Katrina Ligett, 2018, "Commitment in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 2, pages 449-489, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1069-5.
• Michiel Leur & Mikhail Anufriev, 2018, "Timing under individual evolutionary learning in a continuous double auction," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 28, issue 3, pages 609-631, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-017-0530-8.
• Diego Aycinena & Hernán Bejarano & Lucas Rentschler, 2018, "Informed entry in auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 175-205, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9.
• Patrick Hummel, 2018, "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 273-299, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0587-5.
• Patrick Hummel, 2018, "Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and generalized second-price bids," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 331-350, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0591-9.
• Peyman Khezr & Flavio Menezes, 2018, "Auctions with an asking price," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 4, pages 1329-1350, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0620-3.
• Ryuji Sano, 2018, "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 22, issue 3, pages 101-122, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0212-5.
• Noam Cohen & Guy Maor & Aner Sela, 2018, "Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 22, issue 3, pages 177-192, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0216-1.
• Yao Luo & Yuanyuan Wan, 2018, "Integrated-Quantile-Based Estimation for First-Price Auction Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 36, issue 1, pages 173-180, January, DOI: 10.1080/07350015.2016.1166119.
• Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018, "On asymmetric reserve prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2018, "Inefficient rushes in auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Justin Dijk & Erik Ansink, 2018, "Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 18-093/VIII, Nov.
• van der Laan, G. & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Z., 2018, "Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2018-046.
• Yao Luo, 2018, "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions under Restricted Stochastic Dominance," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-606, May.
• Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2018, "Auctions with Limited Commitment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-617, Sep.
• Crampes, Claude & Salant, David, 2018, "A multi-regional model of electric resource adequacy," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 18-877, Jan.
• Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2018, "Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 012, May, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018012.
• Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2018, "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Common-Value Auctions: Extensive vs. Intensive Risk," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 50, Oct.
• Xin Zhao, 2018, "Auction Design by an Informed Seller: The Optimality of Reserve Price Signaling," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 53, Oct.
• Kentaro Tomoeda, 2018, "Efficient Investments in the Implementation Problem," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 54, Dec.
• John Morgan & Dana Sisak & Felix Várdy, 2018, "The Ponds Dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 128, issue 611, pages 1634-1682, June, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12473.
• Pablo Brañas‐Garza & Matteo M. Galizzi & Jeroen Nieboer, 2018, "Experimental And Self‐Reported Measures Of Risk Taking And Digit Ratio (2d:4d): Evidence From A Large, Systematic Study," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 59, issue 3, pages 1131-1157, August, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12299.
• Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2018, "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 59, issue 4, pages 1995-2021, November, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12327.
• André Kallåk Anundsen & Erling Røed Larsen, 2018, "Testing For Micro‐Efficiency In The Housing Market," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 59, issue 4, pages 2133-2162, November, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12332.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2018, "Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 18/09, Sep.
• Requate, Tilman & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Ch'ng, Kean Siang & Waichman, Israel, 2018, "Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work," Economics Working Papers, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics, number 2018-02.
• Adams, Renée & Kräussl, Roman & Navone, Marco & Verwijmeren, Patrick, 2018, "Is gender in the eye of the beholder? Identifying cultural attitudes with art auction prices," CFS Working Paper Series, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), number 595.
• Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2018, "The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 176842.
• Croonenbroeck, Carsten & Odening, Martin & Hüttel, Silke, 2018, "Farmland values and bidder behavior in first-price land auctions," FORLand Working Papers, Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation", number 02 (2018), DOI: 10.18452/18966.
• Gugler, Klaus & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2018, "Effects of government spending on employment: Evidence from winners and runners-up in procurement auctions," SAFE Working Paper Series, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, number 213, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3187331.
• Moser, Johannes, 2018, "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 181506.
• Gesche, Tobias, 2018, "Reference Price Shifts and Customer Antagonism: Evidence from Reviews for Online Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 181650.
• Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2018, "Can the private sector ensure the public interest? Evidence from federal procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 18-045.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2018, "Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 18-056.
• Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andrés Romeu, 2018, "Structural Analysis of First-Price Auction Data: Insights from the Laboratory," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy, number 2018-08, May.
• Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018, "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy, number 2018-12, Aug.
• Ali Hortaçsu & Jakub Kastl & Allen Zhang, 2018, "Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury Auction System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 108, issue 1, pages 147-169, January.
• Noriaki Okamoto, 2018, "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 108, issue 2, pages 555-560, February.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2018, "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 108, issue 2, pages 561-563, February.
• Stefano Lovo & Christophe Spaenjers, 2018, "A Model of Trading in the Art Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 108, issue 3, pages 744-774, March.
• Michael Dinerstein & Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin & Neel Sundaresan, 2018, "Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 108, issue 7, pages 1820-1859, July.
• Daniel Quint & Kenneth Hendricks, 2018, "A Theory of Indicative Bidding," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 2, pages 118-151, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Hörner, 2018, "Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 177-218, August.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2018, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 4, pages 1-26, November.
• Elena Krasnokutskaya & Christian Terwiesch & Lucia Tiererova, 2018, "Trading across Borders in Online Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 4, pages 27-66, November.
• Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2018, "Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 56, issue 1, pages 157-184, March.
• Odening, Martin & Huettel, Silke & Croonenbroeck, Carsten, , "Farmland values and bidder behavior in first-price land auctions," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C., Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, number 274114, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274114.
• Croonenbroeck, Carsten & Odening, Martin & Hüttel, Silke, , "Farmland Values and Bidder Behavior in First-Price Land Auctions," FORLand Project Publications, University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, number 275486, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275486.
• Achilleas Vassilopoulos & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr, 2018, "Loss Aversion, Expectations and Anchoring in the BDM Mechanism," Working Papers, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics, number 2018-1.
• Maurizio Canavari & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Jayson L. Lusk & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., 2018, "How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances," Working Papers, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics, number 2018-5.
• Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2018, "Did Speculation in Land Pay Off for British Investors? Buying and Selecting Land in South Australia, 1835-1850," CEH Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic History, Research School of Economics, Australian National University, number 09, Aug.
• Bo Young Chang & Jun Yang & Parker Liu, 2018, "The Cost of the Government Bond Buyback and Switch Programs in Canada," Staff Analytical Notes, Bank of Canada, number 2018-41, DOI: 10.34989/san-2018-41.
• Pietro Bonaldi & Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas, 2018, "An Auction-Based Test of Private Information in an Interdealer FX Market," Borradores de Economia, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, number 1049, Aug, DOI: 10.32468/be.1049.
• Aner Sela & Asaf Iluz, 2018, "Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1805.
• David Lagziel, 2018, "Credit Auctions And Bid Caps," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1810.
• Eva Tebbe & Korbinian von Blanckenburg, 2018, "Does willingness to pay increase with the number and strictness of sustainability labels?," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, volume 49, issue 1, pages 41-53, January, DOI: 10.1111/agec.12394.
• Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018, "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 56, issue 3, pages 1464-1485, July, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12504.
• Damian S. Damianov & Ronald Peeters, 2018, "Prize‐Based Mechanisms For Fund‐Raising: Theory And Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 56, issue 3, pages 1562-1584, July, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12570.
• Glenn Boyle & Gerald Ward, 2018, "Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better? A Buyback Puzzle," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 56, issue 4, pages 2137-2157, October, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12688.
• Brunella Bruno & Emilia Garcia‐Appendini & Giacomo Nocera, 2018, "Experience and Brokerage in Asset Markets: Evidence from Art Auctions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, volume 47, issue 4, pages 833-864, December, DOI: 10.1111/fima.12207.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018, "Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type‐Independent Preference Orderings," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 69, issue 4, pages 363-373, December, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12176.
• Daniele Condorelli & Andrea Galeotti & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018, "Selling through referrals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 27, issue 4, pages 669-685, October, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12251.
• Andrea Morone & Francesco Nemore & Simone Nuzzo, 2018, "Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 20, issue 4, pages 582-612, August, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12295.
• Javier D. Donna & José†Antonio Espín†Sánchez, 2018, "Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 49, issue 1, pages 87-127, March, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12221.
• Ari Hyytinen & Sofia Lundberg & Otto Toivanen, 2018, "Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 49, issue 2, pages 398-426, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12232.
• Benny Moldovanu & Deniz Dizdar & Nora Szech, 2018, "The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_030, Jul.
• Benny Moldovanu & Alex Gershkov & Philipp Strack, 2018, "A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_031, Jul.
• Mengxi Zhang, 2018, "Auctions vs. Negotiations: Optimal Selling Mechanism With Endogenous Bidder Values," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_054, Nov.
• Peeters Ronald & Tenev Anastas P., 2018, "Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 3, pages 1-4, July, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0025.
• Matsushima Hitoshi, 2018, "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-16, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0168.
• Cohensius Gal & Segev Ella, 2018, "Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-21, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0196.
• Foster Joshua, 2018, "Wars of Attrition with Endogenously Determined Budget Constraints," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 2, pages 1-10, July, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0197.
• Wang Tao & Wang Ruqu, 2018, "Limited Liability and High Bids in English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 2, pages 1-12, July, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0152.
• Brorsen B. Wade & Fain James R. & Maples Joshua G., 2018, "Alternative Policy Responses to Increased Use of Formula Pricing," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, volume 16, issue 1, pages 1-11, January, DOI: 10.1515/jafio-2017-0008.
• Dekel Omer & Dotan Yoav, 2018, "Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 14, issue 2, pages 1-30, July, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0014.
• Grubb, M. & Newbery, D., 2018, "UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: Emerging Lessons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1834, Jun.
• Teirilä, J. & Ritz, R., 2018, "Strategic behaviour in a capacity market? The new Irish electricity market design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1863, Oct.
• Eldridge, B. & O’Neill, R. & Hobbs, B., 2018, "Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit Commitment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1872, Nov.
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• Semyon Malamud & Marzena J. Rostek, 2018, "Decentralized Exchange," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 18-25, Mar, revised Apr 2018.
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• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018, "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2133, May.
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• Moya, Andrés, 2018, "Violence, psychological trauma, and risk attitudes: Evidence from victims of violence in Colombia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 15-27, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.11.001.
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• Jagadeesan, Ravi, 2018, "Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 275-286, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015.
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