Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2000

• Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode & Shyam Sunder, 2000, "Double Auction Dynamics: Structural Effects Of Non-Binding Price Controls," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management, number ysm1, Mar.
• Oehler, Andreas & Heilmann, Klaus & Läger, Volker, 2000, "Do Insiders Contribute to Market Efficiency? Informational Efficiency and Liquidity of Experimental Call Markets with and without Insiders," Discussion Papers, University of Bamberg, Chair of Finance, number 11.
• Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000, "Implementing efficient market structure," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,19.
• Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2000, "Merger in contests," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,3.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2000, "Auctions and fair division games: A cross-cultural bidding experiment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,31.
• Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000, "Auctions and corruption," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,40.
• Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2000, "Divisionalization in contests," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,9.
• Gampfer, Ralf, 2000, "Die optimale Versteigerungsreihenfolge in sequentiellen Zweitpreisauktionen bei Synergieeffekten," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 202.
• Jeroen M. Swinkels & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000, "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 3, pages 499-525, June.
• David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 2000, "Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 4, pages 944-960, September.
• David Lucking-Reiley & John A. List, 2000, "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 4, pages 961-972, September.
• David Lucking-Reiley, 2000, "Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 183-192, Summer.
• Bikhchandani,S. & Haile,P.A. & Riley,J.G., 2000, "Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 17R.
• Ephraim Clark & Gérard Mondello, 2000, "Water Management in France: Delegation and Irreversibility," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, volume 3, pages 325-352, November.
• Frederick Van der Ploeg, 2004, "The Welfare State, Redistribution and the Economy, Reciprocal Altruism, Consumer Rivalry and Second Best," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 1234.
• Motty Perry & Elmar G. Wolfstetter & Shmuel Zamir, 2000, "A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 249.
• Juan Ayuso & Rafael Repullo, 2000, "A Model of the Open Market Operations of the European Central Bank," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2000_0011.
• EINY, Ezra & HAIMANKO, Ori & ORZACH, Ram & SELA, Aner, 2000, "Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2000055, Nov.
• Verdier, Thierry & Compte, Olivier & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2000, "Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2434, Apr.
• Jehiel, Philippe & moldovanu, benny, 2000, "License Auctions and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2530, Aug.
• Klemperer, Paul, 2000, "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2572, Oct.
• Klemperer, Paul, 2000, "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2581, Oct.
• Repullo, Rafael & Ayuso, Juan, 2000, "A Model of the Open Market Operations of the European Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2605, Nov.
• Luc BAUWENS & Victor GINSBURGH, 2000, "Art experts and auctions Are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 2000022, Jun.
• Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2000, "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1276, Sep.
• Estelle Cantillon, 2000, "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1279, Oct.
• Compte, O. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. & Verdier, T., 2000, "Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 2000-01.
• Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2000, "Implementing Efficient Market Structure," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 0268, Aug.
• Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000, "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 0791, Aug.
• Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000, "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 1210, Aug.
• Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2000, "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 1827, Aug.
• Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2000, "How to Auction an Essential Facility when Underhand Integration is Possible," Documentos de Trabajo, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile, number 79.
• Ganuza, Juan-Jose & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2000, "Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 67, issue 1, pages 105-112, April.
• Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000, "Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 68, issue 1, pages 61-66, July.
• Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel, 2000, "A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 33, issue 2, pages 265-273, November.
• Vagstad, Steinar, 2000, "Centralized vs. decentralized procurement: Does dispersed information call for decentralized decision-making?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 6, pages 949-963, August.
• Kjerstad, Egil & Vagstad, Steinar, 2000, "Procurement auctions with entry of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 8, pages 1243-1257, December.
• Peters, Michael, 2000, "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 95, issue 2, pages 139-168, December.
• Kaplan, T.R. & Luski, I. & Wettstein, D., 2000, "Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 0006.
• Romsas, T. & Sasaki, D., 2000, "Preferred Bidders' Curse in a Simultaneous Ascending Auction with a Case Study on an Australian Broadband Spectrum Auction," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 0016.
• John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000, "Demand reduction in a multi-unit auction: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment," Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00180.
• Rama Katkar & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000, "Public versus secret reserve prices in ebay auctions: Results from a pokemon field experiment," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00285.
• John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000, "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00520.
• Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2000, "Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), volume 54, issue 2, April.
• Vagstad, S., 2000, "Centralized vs. Decentralized procurement: does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 211.
• Kjerstad, E. & Vagstad, S., 2000, "Procurement Auctions with Entry of Bidders," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 215.
• Ayuso, J. & Repullo, R., 2000, "A Model of the Open Market Operations of the European Central Bank," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 0011.
• Cornu, P. & Isakov, D., 2000, "The Optimal Strategy of the Initial Bidder in Takeover Contests: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 2000.04.
• Preget, R. & Waelbroeck, P., 2000, "Econometric Analysis of Market Bid Functions in French Treasury Bill Auctions," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 2000.106.
• Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000, "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 00-13.
• Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000, "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 2000-13.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 2000, "Information in Conflicts," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 388, Jun.
• Roberto Burguet, 2000, "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, volume 24, issue 1, pages 3-50, January.
• Nicolaisen, James & Petrov, Valentin & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2000, "Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 1952, Aug.
• Antoni Bosch-Domenech & Shyam Sunder, 2000, "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 16, issue 3, pages 257-284, December.
• Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000, "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 17, issue 3, pages 229-252, May.

1999

• Samuel H. Dinkin & James C. Cox & Vernon L. Smith, 1999, "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 1, pages 319-324, March.
• John H. Kagel & Colin M. Campbell & Dan Levin, 1999, "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 1, pages 325-334, March.
• David Lucking-Reiley, 1999, "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 5, pages 1063-1080, December.
• Shi, Shouyong & Cao, Melanie, 1999, "Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273416, Feb, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273416.
• Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, volume 13, issue 3, pages 227-286, July, DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00083.
• Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman, 1999, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 8, issue 2, pages 191-221, June, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00191.x.
• Michal Bresky, 1999, "Equilibria in Multi-unit Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, number wp145, Jun.
• Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999, "Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1063, Mar.
• Klemperer, Paul, 1999, "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2163, Jun.
• Branco, Fernando, 1999, "Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2270, Oct.
• Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 1999, "Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, number 80, Feb.
• Sébastien Lecocq & Thierry Magnac & Marie-Laure Pichery & Michael Visser, 1999, "The Impact of Information on Wine Auction Prices : Results of an Experiment," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 99-36.
• Ahmed Anwar, 1999, "The Case for a Discriminatory Pricing Rule in Competitive Electricity Pools," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 39, Jul.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 2, issue 2, pages 99-134, May.
• Kultti, Klaus, 1999, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 1, pages 106-113, April.
• Cameron, Lisa & Cramton, Peter, 1999, "The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, volume 12, issue 3, pages 71-81, April.
• Vayanos, Dimitri, 1999, "Strategic trading and welfare in a dynamic market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 449, Apr.
• David Lucking-Reiley, 1999, "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00183.
• Menezes, Flavio Marques & Monteiro, P. K., 1999, "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE), EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), number 360, Oct.
• Menezes, F., 1999, "Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-Unit Demands: a Survey," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 363.
• Menezes, F. & Monteiro, P.K., 1999, "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 366.
• Lunander, A., 1999, "Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1999:17.
• Thierry Foucault, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00459769, May, DOI: 10.1016/S1386-4181(98)00012-3.
• Konrad, Kai A. & Peters, Wolfgang & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999, "Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 316, Apr.
• Lunander, Anders, 1999, "Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1999:17, Oct.
• Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999, "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 2, issue 1, pages 59-75, August, DOI: 10.1023/A:1009929832148.
• Olivier Chanel & Stéphanie Vincent, 1999, "The Declining Price Effect in Sequential Auctions: What Theory Does Not Predict," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1999-13, Sep.
• Lebrun, Bernard & Tremblay, Marie-Christine, 1999, "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with One-Dimensional Multi-Unit Demands," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9921.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "Continuity of the First Price Auction Nash Equilibrium Correspondance," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9922.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "A Simple Proof of the Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9923.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "First Order Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9924.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9925.
• Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999, "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 99-12, Jun.
• Hyde, C.E. & Vercammen, J.A., 1999, "Debt-Funded Bidding Under Credit Market and Auction Information Asymmetries: Private Values & First-Price Sealed Bids," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 677.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1999, "Collusion in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 707.
• Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999, "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 99-75.
• Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 1999, "Public Debt Repudiation: is it Really Possible in the EMU? A Political Economy Approach," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 375-402.
• Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999, "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 7185, Jun.
• Oscar Volij, 1999, "Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 009, Mar, revised 25 Mar 1999.
• Klemperer, P., 1999, "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 1999-w12.
• Dimitri Vayanos, 1999, "Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 66, issue 2, pages 219-254.
• Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 1999, "The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 99eedecr, revised Feb 1998.
• Lisa Cameron & Peter Cramton, 1999, "The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 99ej, Apr, revised 01 Apr 1999.
• Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 1999, "Screening, Bidding, And The Loan Market Tightness," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 989, Feb.
• Skrzypacz, A. & Hopenhayn, H., 1999, "Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 463.
• Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 1999, "Public debt repudiation: Is it really possible in the EMU? A political economy approach," Working Papers in Public Economics, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, number 33, Jan.
• Keith Waehrer, 1999, "The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 171-181.
• Paul J. Brewer, 1999, "Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 41-92.
• Michael Peters, 1999, "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 273-292.
• Gerard J. van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours & Menno P. Pradhan, 1999, "Declining Prices in the Sequential Dutch Flower Auction of Roses," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-074/3, Sep.
• van den Berg, G. & van Ours, J.C. & Pradhan, M.P., 1999, "Declining Prices in the Sequential Dutch Flower Auction of Roses," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-52.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-77.
• van den Berg, G. & van Ours, J.C. & Pradhan, M.P., 1999, "Declining Prices in the Sequential Dutch Flower Auction of Roses," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 174fe3c1-411e-4443-8b18-6.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 1b6c0708-b2c1-4276-ada5-d.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 auction," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 91daa0d5-2984-4ad9-afce-0.
• Michael B. Gordy, 1999, "Hedging Winner'S Curse With Multiple Bids: Evidence From The Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 81, issue 3, pages 448-465, August.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 107, issue 3, pages 427-454, June, DOI: 10.1086/250068.
• Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 1999, "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Virginia Economics Online Papers, University of Virginia, Department of Economics, number 337, Nov.
• Berg, Gerard J. van den & Ours, Jan C. van & Pradhan, Menno P., 1999, "Declining prices in the sequential Dutch flower auction of roses," Serie Research Memoranda, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics, number 0040.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9903005, Mar.
• Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999, "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9901004, Jan.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Prices and the Winner's Curse," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9904003, Apr.
• Robert F. Easley & Rafael Tenorio, 1999, "Bidding Strategies in Internet Yankee Auctions," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907001, Jul.
• Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999, "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 99-75, Jul.
• Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Königstein, Manfred & Strobel, Martin, 1999, "Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,101.
• Güth, Werner & Ivanova, Radosveta & Königstein, Manfred & Strobel, Martin, 1999, "Learning to bid: An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,70.
• Nautz, Dieter & Oechssler, Jörg, 1999, "The repo auctions of the European Central Bank and the vanishing quota puzzle," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,79.
• Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999, "Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,18.

1998

• Sherstyuk, K., 1998, "Collusion without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 610.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1998, "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97jems, Jun, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1998, "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98cra2, Mar.
• Peter Cramton, 1998, "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98eer, Jul, revised 28 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & John Williams, 1998, "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98jleer, Jul, revised 12 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton, 1998, "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98jlefcc, Jul, revised 27 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1998, "A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98mdi, Sep.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998, "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpoe, May, revised 18 Jun 1999.
• Singh, Bhupal & Dhal, Sarat C., 1998, "Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 12147, Sep.
• Alan Gunderson & Ruqu Wang, 1998, "Signally By Jump Bidding In Private Value Auctions," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 975, Oct.
• Parimal Kanti Bag & Emim Murat Dinlersoz & Ruqu Wang, 1998, "More On Phantom Bidding," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 976, Oct.
• Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998, "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-98-34, May.
• Péter Esõ, 1998, "Farkas Törvény az Árveréselméletben," Rajk László Szakkollégium Working Papers, Rajk László College, number 1, Mar.
• Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998, "Bidding for Labour," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp98-03.
• Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998, "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 227-258.
• Ulrich Kamecke, 1998, "Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 27, issue 3, pages 407-426.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "Structural Estimation Of Auction Models," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-01, Sep.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-02, Sep.
• Michael Peters, 1998, "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-98-01, Jul.
• Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998, "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 41, issue 2, pages 647-675, October, DOI: 10.1086/467407.
• Cramton, Peter, 1998, "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 41, issue 2, pages 727-736, October, DOI: 10.1086/467410.
• Juan J. Ganuza & Lambros Pechlivanos, 1998, "Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 377, Jan, revised Jan 1999.
• Juan J. Ganuza, 1998, "Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 471, Oct, revised Mar 2002.
• Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998, "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805001, May, revised 26 Jul 1999.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809003, Sep.
• Oehler, Andreas & Unser, Matthias, 1998, "Market Transparency and Call Markets," Discussion Papers, University of Bamberg, Chair of Finance, number 6.
• Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1998, "Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,62.
• Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel, 1998, "A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,63.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 643-651, June.
• Wang, Ruqu & Bag, Parimal Kanti & Dinlersoz, Murat Emim, 1998, "More on Phantom Bidding," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273405, Oct, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273405.
• Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998, "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10668, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10668.
• Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998, "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, number 197846, Feb, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.197846.
• Burguet, R., 1998, "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 422.98.
• Ruqu Wang, 1998, "Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 2, pages 395-410, May.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998010, Jan.
• CALCAGNO, Riccardo & LOVO, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998016, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & JOUNEAU, Fréféric, 1998, "A Bayesian approach to the econometrics of first-price auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998031, Apr.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1998, "Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in Dynamic Limit Order Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1817, Mar.
• Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2030, Nov.
• Calcagno, Riccardo & Lovo, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market Makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1998012, May.
• Giuseppe Moscarini & Marco Ottaviani, 1998, "Price Competition for an Informed Buyer," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1199, Oct.
• Cramton, Peter, 1998, "Ascending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 745-756, May.
• Klemperer, Paul, 1998, "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 757-769, May.
• Gjerstad, Steven & Dickhaut, John, 1998, "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 1, pages 1-29, January.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1998, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 82, issue 1, pages 65-88, September.
• Eugenia Kazamaki Ottersten, 1998, "Screening contracts when institutions matter : an example," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, volume 11, issue 2, pages 110-116, Autumn.
• Leonardo Felli & Francesca Cornelli, 1998, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp300, Aug.
• Chanel, O. & Vincent, S., 1998, "Price Decline in Sequential Auction: Reasons and Measures," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98b05.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 93.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 95.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0093, Sep.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0095, May.
• Parlane, S., 1998, "Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability," Papers, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-, number 98/3.
• Parlane, S., 1998, "Contracting with Capacity Constrained Suppliers," Papers, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-, number 98/4.
• Laffont, J.-J. & Loisel, P. & Robert, J., 1998, "Intra-Day Dynamics in Sequential Auctions: Theory and Estimation," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 98.488.
• P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998, "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1857.