Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1999

• Sébastien Lecocq & Thierry Magnac & Marie-Laure Pichery & Michael Visser, 1999, "The Impact of Information on Wine Auction Prices : Results of an Experiment," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 99-36.
• Ahmed Anwar, 1999, "The Case for a Discriminatory Pricing Rule in Competitive Electricity Pools," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 39, Jul.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 2, issue 2, pages 99-134, May.
• Kultti, Klaus, 1999, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 1, pages 106-113, April.
• Cameron, Lisa & Cramton, Peter, 1999, "The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, volume 12, issue 3, pages 71-81, April.
• Vayanos, Dimitri, 1999, "Strategic trading and welfare in a dynamic market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 449, Apr.
• David Lucking-Reiley, 1999, "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00183.
• Menezes, Flavio Marques & Monteiro, P. K., 1999, "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE), EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), number 360, Oct.
• Menezes, F., 1999, "Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-Unit Demands: a Survey," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 363.
• Menezes, F. & Monteiro, P.K., 1999, "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 366.
• Lunander, A., 1999, "Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1999:17.
• Thierry Foucault, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00459769, May, DOI: 10.1016/S1386-4181(98)00012-3.
• Konrad, Kai A. & Peters, Wolfgang & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999, "Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 316, Apr.
• Lunander, Anders, 1999, "Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1999:17, Oct.
• Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999, "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 2, issue 1, pages 59-75, August, DOI: 10.1023/A:1009929832148.
• Olivier Chanel & Stéphanie Vincent, 1999, "The Declining Price Effect in Sequential Auctions: What Theory Does Not Predict," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1999-13, Sep.
• Lebrun, Bernard & Tremblay, Marie-Christine, 1999, "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with One-Dimensional Multi-Unit Demands," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9921.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "Continuity of the First Price Auction Nash Equilibrium Correspondance," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9922.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "A Simple Proof of the Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9923.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "First Order Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9924.
• Lebrun, Bernard, 1999, "First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9925.
• Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999, "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 99-12, Jun.
• Hyde, C.E. & Vercammen, J.A., 1999, "Debt-Funded Bidding Under Credit Market and Auction Information Asymmetries: Private Values & First-Price Sealed Bids," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 677.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1999, "Collusion in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 707.
• Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999, "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 99-75.
• Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 1999, "Public Debt Repudiation: is it Really Possible in the EMU? A Political Economy Approach," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 375-402.
• Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999, "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 7185, Jun.
• Oscar Volij, 1999, "Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 009, Mar, revised 25 Mar 1999.
• Klemperer, P., 1999, "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 1999-w12.
• Dimitri Vayanos, 1999, "Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 66, issue 2, pages 219-254.
• Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 1999, "The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 99eedecr, revised Feb 1998.
• Lisa Cameron & Peter Cramton, 1999, "The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 99ej, Apr, revised 01 Apr 1999.
• Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 1999, "Screening, Bidding, And The Loan Market Tightness," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 989, Feb.
• Skrzypacz, A. & Hopenhayn, H., 1999, "Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 463.
• Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 1999, "Public debt repudiation: Is it really possible in the EMU? A political economy approach," Working Papers in Public Economics, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, number 33, Jan.
• Keith Waehrer, 1999, "The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 171-181.
• Paul J. Brewer, 1999, "Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 41-92.
• Michael Peters, 1999, "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 273-292.
• Gerard J. van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours & Menno P. Pradhan, 1999, "Declining Prices in the Sequential Dutch Flower Auction of Roses," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-074/3, Sep.
• van den Berg, G. & van Ours, J.C. & Pradhan, M.P., 1999, "Declining Prices in the Sequential Dutch Flower Auction of Roses," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-52.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-77.
• van den Berg, G. & van Ours, J.C. & Pradhan, M.P., 1999, "Declining Prices in the Sequential Dutch Flower Auction of Roses," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 174fe3c1-411e-4443-8b18-6.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 1b6c0708-b2c1-4276-ada5-d.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 auction," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 91daa0d5-2984-4ad9-afce-0.
• Michael B. Gordy, 1999, "Hedging Winner'S Curse With Multiple Bids: Evidence From The Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 81, issue 3, pages 448-465, August.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 107, issue 3, pages 427-454, June, DOI: 10.1086/250068.
• Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 1999, "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Virginia Economics Online Papers, University of Virginia, Department of Economics, number 337, Nov.
• Berg, Gerard J. van den & Ours, Jan C. van & Pradhan, Menno P., 1999, "Declining prices in the sequential Dutch flower auction of roses," Serie Research Memoranda, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics, number 0040.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9903005, Mar.
• Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999, "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9901004, Jan.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "Prices and the Winner's Curse," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9904003, Apr.
• Robert F. Easley & Rafael Tenorio, 1999, "Bidding Strategies in Internet Yankee Auctions," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907001, Jul.
• Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999, "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 99-75, Jul.
• Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Königstein, Manfred & Strobel, Martin, 1999, "Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,101.
• Güth, Werner & Ivanova, Radosveta & Königstein, Manfred & Strobel, Martin, 1999, "Learning to bid: An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,70.
• Nautz, Dieter & Oechssler, Jörg, 1999, "The repo auctions of the European Central Bank and the vanishing quota puzzle," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,79.
• Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999, "Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 2000,18.

1998

• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1998, "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97jems, Jun, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1998, "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98cra2, Mar.
• Peter Cramton, 1998, "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98eer, Jul, revised 28 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & John Williams, 1998, "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98jleer, Jul, revised 12 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton, 1998, "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98jlefcc, Jul, revised 27 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1998, "A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98mdi, Sep.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998, "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpoe, May, revised 18 Jun 1999.
• Singh, Bhupal & Dhal, Sarat C., 1998, "Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 12147, Sep.
• Alan Gunderson & Ruqu Wang, 1998, "Signally By Jump Bidding In Private Value Auctions," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 975, Oct.
• Parimal Kanti Bag & Emim Murat Dinlersoz & Ruqu Wang, 1998, "More On Phantom Bidding," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 976, Oct.
• Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998, "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-98-34, May.
• Péter Esõ, 1998, "Farkas Törvény az Árveréselméletben," Rajk László Szakkollégium Working Papers, Rajk László College, number 1, Mar.
• Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998, "Bidding for Labour," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp98-03.
• Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998, "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 227-258.
• Ulrich Kamecke, 1998, "Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 27, issue 3, pages 407-426.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "Structural Estimation Of Auction Models," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-01, Sep.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-02, Sep.
• Michael Peters, 1998, "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-98-01, Jul.
• Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998, "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 41, issue 2, pages 647-675, October, DOI: 10.1086/467407.
• Cramton, Peter, 1998, "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 41, issue 2, pages 727-736, October, DOI: 10.1086/467410.
• Juan J. Ganuza & Lambros Pechlivanos, 1998, "Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 377, Jan, revised Jan 1999.
• Juan J. Ganuza, 1998, "Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 471, Oct, revised Mar 2002.
• Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998, "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805001, May, revised 26 Jul 1999.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809003, Sep.
• Oehler, Andreas & Unser, Matthias, 1998, "Market Transparency and Call Markets," Discussion Papers, University of Bamberg, Chair of Finance, number 6.
• Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1998, "Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,62.
• Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel, 1998, "A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,63.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 643-651, June.
• Wang, Ruqu & Bag, Parimal Kanti & Dinlersoz, Murat Emim, 1998, "More on Phantom Bidding," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273405, Oct, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273405.
• Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998, "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10668, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10668.
• Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998, "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, number 197846, Feb, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.197846.
• Burguet, R., 1998, "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 422.98.
• Ruqu Wang, 1998, "Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 2, pages 395-410, May.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998010, Jan.
• CALCAGNO, Riccardo & LOVO, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998016, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & JOUNEAU, Fréféric, 1998, "A Bayesian approach to the econometrics of first-price auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998031, Apr.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1998, "Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in Dynamic Limit Order Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1817, Mar.
• Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2030, Nov.
• Calcagno, Riccardo & Lovo, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market Makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1998012, May.
• Giuseppe Moscarini & Marco Ottaviani, 1998, "Price Competition for an Informed Buyer," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1199, Oct.
• Cramton, Peter, 1998, "Ascending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 745-756, May.
• Klemperer, Paul, 1998, "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 757-769, May.
• Gjerstad, Steven & Dickhaut, John, 1998, "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 1, pages 1-29, January.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1998, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 82, issue 1, pages 65-88, September.
• Eugenia Kazamaki Ottersten, 1998, "Screening contracts when institutions matter : an example," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, volume 11, issue 2, pages 110-116, Autumn.
• Leonardo Felli & Francesca Cornelli, 1998, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp300, Aug.
• Chanel, O. & Vincent, S., 1998, "Price Decline in Sequential Auction: Reasons and Measures," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98b05.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 93.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 95.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0093, Sep.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0095, May.
• Parlane, S., 1998, "Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability," Papers, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-, number 98/3.
• Parlane, S., 1998, "Contracting with Capacity Constrained Suppliers," Papers, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-, number 98/4.
• Laffont, J.-J. & Loisel, P. & Robert, J., 1998, "Intra-Day Dynamics in Sequential Auctions: Theory and Estimation," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 98.488.
• P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998, "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1857.
• Gupta, M. & Lebrun, B., 1998, "A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Energie, number 98-08.
• Bergman, Mats A. & Lundberg, Sofia, 1998, "Auctioned and Re-Auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 273, Oct.
• von der Fehr, N.-H. M. & Riis, C., 1998, "Option Values in Sequential Markets," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 07/1998.
• Bergman, Mats & Lundberg, Sofia, 1998, "Auctioned and Re-auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 468, May.
• Menezes, Flavio M & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 1998, "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, volume 17, issue 3, pages 219-232, November.
• Kala Krishna & Torben Tranæs, 1998, "Allocating multiple units by sealed-bid auctions," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-05, Apr.
• Stéphanie Vincent, 1998, "Sequential auctions with heterogeneous bidders," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-19, Oct.
• Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1998, "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 9809, May.
• Lebrun, Bernard & Gupta, Madhurima, 1998, "A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9819.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1998, "Collusion without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 610.

1997

• Peter Cramton, 1997, "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 6, issue 3, pages 431-495, September, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00431.x.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997, "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 6, issue 3, pages 497-527, September, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00497.x.
• Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997, "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-29, Jun.
• KLINGER MONTEIRO, Paulo, 1997, "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997042, Jun.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997077, Oct.
• Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1997, "Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1541, Jan.
• Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1997, "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1564, Jan.
• Klemperer, Paul, 1997, "Almost Common Value Auctions: The 'Wallet Game' and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1682, Aug.
• Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1997, "The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1754, Nov.
• Bosch-Domenech, Antoni & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1997, "Credit Constraints in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 107, issue 444, pages 1445-1464, September.
• Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997, "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 1, pages 1-35, January.
• Cameron, Lisa J. & Cramton, Peter & Wilson, Robert, 1997, "Using auctions to divest generation assets," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, volume 10, issue 10, pages 22-31, December.
• d'Aspremont, C & Cremer, J & Gerard-Varet, L-A, 1997, "Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a15.
• Vagstad, S., 1997, "Centralized vs. Decentralized Procurement: Does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1497.
• Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman, 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0083, Mar.
• Minehart, D. & Neeman, Z., 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 83.
• Celentani, M. & Ganuza, J.-J., 1997, "Auctions and the Dynamics of Corruption," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 97.459.
• Stewart, M & Wu, C-L, 1997, "The Right To Host The Olympic Games Should Be Auctioned To The Highest Bidder," Papers, Melbourne - Centre in Finance, number 97-1.
• Zheng, C.Z., 1997, "The Optimal Design of First-Price Auctions with Financial Constraints and Default Risks," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 301.
• Pezanis-Christou, P, 1997, "On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 97/05.
• Eső, Péter, 1997, "Árverés és verseny a közbeszerzésben
  [Auction and competition in public procurement]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 597-611.
• Peter Lyk-Jensen, 1997, "How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals are Affiliated," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-05, Feb.
• Athey, S., 1997, "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Vleugels, Jan, 1997, "Bidding against an unknown number of competitors sharing affiliated information," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 97-13.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 97-11.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997, "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5872, Jan.
• Catherine D. Wolfram, 1997, "Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6269, Nov.
• Klemperer, P., 1997, "Almost Common Value Auctions: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 134.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97cra, Sep.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97cra1b, Oct.
• Lisa J. Cameron & Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97elec, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton, 1997, "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97jemsfcc, revised 12 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Andrew Parece & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Auction Design for Standard Offer Service," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97wpad, Sep, revised 26 Sep 1997.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997, "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpas, Feb, revised Mar 1998.
• Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997, "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 28, issue 3, pages 544-565, Autumn.
• Tony Curzon Price, 1997, "Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 219-254.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Price Formation by Bargaining and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-56.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-57.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number fad8afd3-eb42-4a0d-8d60-8.
• Michael Peters, 1997, "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-97-02, Jul.
• Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997, "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 105, issue 4, pages 657-699, August, DOI: 10.1086/262089.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 208, Feb.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "Auctions of licences and market structure," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 209, Feb.
• Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997, "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703010, Mar, revised 28 Apr 1998.
• Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707010, Jul, revised 01 Apr 1998.
• Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997, "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9701004, Jan.
• Michael B. Gordy, 1997, "Hedging Winner's Curse with Multiple Bids: Evidence from the Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9702002, Feb.
• Hon-Suir, S. & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 97-11, Jun.

1996

• Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee & Elizabeth M. Bailey, 1996, "Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5745, Sep.
• Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1168, Oct.
• Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1173, Oct.
• Beggs, A. & Graddy, K., 1996, "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 99184.
• Robert A. Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1996, "Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 43, issue 2, pages 395-418, June.
• Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996, "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 96slr, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Hermann Schnabl, 1996, "A close eye on the invisible hand," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 261-280.
• Fernando Branco, 1996, "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 283-309, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499137.
• Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996, "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_12.
• Katz, B.G. & Owen, J., 1996, "The Investment Choices of Voucher Holders and Their Impact on Privarizad Firm Performance," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 96-08.
• Michael Peters, 1996, "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-01, Apr.
• Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 1996, "Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 105, Oct.
• Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Shyam Sunder, 1996, "Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 91, Jun.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9608001, Aug.