IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk

  • Oscar Volij

    (Department of Economics, Brown University, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)

This paper analyzes symmetric, single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently and identically distributed, buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a big family of mechanisms which includes the standard auctions. It is also shown that in the linear equilibria of the sealed bid double auction, as the degree of players' risk aversion grows arbitrarily large, the ex post inefficiency of the mechanism tends to vanish.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://volij.co.il/publications/papers/auct3.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Oscar Volij in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 009.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 05 Mar 1999
Date of revision: 25 Mar 1999
Publication status: Published in Economics Letters, 76(2), 231--237, 2002
Handle: RePEc:nid:ovolij:009
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
Web page: http://volij.co.il/

Order Information: Web: http://volij.co.il/addr.html

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nid:ovolij:009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oscar Volij)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.