Debt-Funded Bidding Under Credit Market and Auction Information Asymmetries: Private Values & First-Price Sealed Bids
We examine lending and bidding when bidders, whose valuation for the good and wealth are private information, must borrow to fund their bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Any separating equilibrium is unique and the winning bidder typw randomnizes their bids.
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