Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
In this note I prove the existence of the optimal-pay auction when signals are correlated.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 1997|
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- McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
- Page Jr., F.H., 1997.
"Existence of Optimal Auctions in General Environments,"
1997-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
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