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Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA)

  • Charles M. Kahn

    (Department of Finance, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA)

Abstract

Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:12:y:1998:i:2:p:227-258
    Note: Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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