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Auction theory: a guided tour

  • Roberto Burguet

    (Colegio de México e Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC))

I present an overview of what has been the theoretical analysis of auctions in the last two decades. The goal is to offer a systematic exposition of the main issue addressed by this literature with more emphasis on why than on what. For that, I present a unified framework that takes the reader through the analysis of both design questions and positive ones dealing with the workings of several standard institutions. At the end of the tour, the reader will find him or herself inside the realm of market design and the theory of price formation.

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Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.

Volume (Year): 24 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 3-50

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Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:24:y:2000:i:1:p:3-50
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  19. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-47, February.
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