A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
- Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-688, May.
- Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
- Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985.
"Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Karlin, Samuel & Rinott, Yosef, 1980. "Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 467-498, December.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
- Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-445, June.
- Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
Most related itemsThese are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
- Szentes, Balazs, 2005. "Equilibrium transformations and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 175-205, February.
- Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997.
"Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Laffont, J.J., 1996. "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers 95.394, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
- Florence Naegelen, 1986. "La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(4), pages 605-636.
- Tunca, Tunay I., 2008. "Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(9-10), pages 964-996, September.
- Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
- Kozloff, Keith & Taff, Steven J., 1990. "Perspectives On Competitive Bidding: Retirement Of Environmentally Sensitive Farmland," Staff Papers 13822, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
- García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
- Castro, Luciano I. de, 2007. "Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we074622, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2015. "Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 60-74.
- Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Bali, Valentina & Jackson, Matthew, 2002. "Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 161-176, September.
- Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
- Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997. "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers 208, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004.
"Successful uninformed bidding,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
- Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society.
- Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Abraham, Ittai & Athey, Susan & Babaioff, Moshe & Grubb, Michael D., 2020. "Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 454-477.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:5:p:1089-1122. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.