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Optimal Auction Design

Author

Listed:
  • Roger B. Myerson

    (Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60201)

Abstract

This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:6:y:1981:i:1:p:58-73
    as

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roth, Alvin, 2012. "The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-9.
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