Présentation générale
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DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2002.6877
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2002.6877
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- Gilbert Abraham-Frois & Pierre Malgrange, 2001. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 150(4), pages 89-94.
- Pierre Malgrange & Michel Moreaux & Michel Mougeot, 2000. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 1-10.
- Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 73-82.
- Anne Épaulard & Jean-Pierre Laffargue & Pierre Malgrange, 2008. "Présentation générale," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 1-13.
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- Francesco Sergi, 2015. "L'histoire (faussement) naïve des modèles DSGE," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01222798, HAL.
- Hélène Erkel-Rousse, 2006. "Les enquêtes de conjoncture : de l'analyse conjoncturelle aux études structurelles," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 395(1), pages 3-11.
- Francesco Sergi, 2015. "L'histoire (faussement) naïve des modèles DSGE," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15066, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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