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Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

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  • Page Jr., Frank H.

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  • Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:29:y:1998:i:4:p:389-418
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    1. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1994. "Dominant Strategy Mechanisms for Contract Auctions with Risk Aversion and Moral Hazard," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 25-42.
    2. Menezes, Flavio M & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 1998. "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 219-232, November.
    3. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    4. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    5. Funk, Peter, 1996. "Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 51-64.
    6. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August.
    7. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    8. Page, F H, Jr, 1989. "Incentive Compatible Strategies for General Stackelberg Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(4), pages 409-421.
    9. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
    10. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    11. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    12. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    13. Nowak, Andrzej S. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 1998. "Nonzero-sum Stochastic Games," MPRA Paper 19995, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1999.
    14. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
    15. Balder, Erik J., 1996. "On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 133-148, January.
    16. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 77-101.
    17. Menezes F. M. & Monteiro, P. K., 1996. "Existence of equilibrium in a descriminatory price auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-61, February.
    18. Lebrun, Bernard, 1996. "Existence of an Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 421-443, April.
    19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
    20. Page, F H, Jr, 1991. "Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(4), pages 323-338, October.
    21. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    22. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    23. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    24. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(4), pages 509-524, October.
    25. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-361, March.
    26. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
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    1. Nishizaki, Ichiro & Hayashida, Tomohiro & Sekizaki, Shinya & Okabe, Junya, 2022. "Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 300(1), pages 255-268.
    2. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2000. "Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 54(2), April.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2001. "A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
    4. Tomohiro Hayashida & Ichiro Nishizaki & Shinya Sekizaki & Junya Okabe, 2023. "Data Envelopment Analysis Approaches for Multiperiod Two-Level Production and Distribution Planning Problems," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-25, October.
    5. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Svaiter, Benar Fux, 2010. "Optimal auction with a general distribution: Virtual valuation without densities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 21-31, January.

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