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Simultaneous Ooled Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Menezes, F.M.
  • Monteiro, P.K.

Abstract

This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is an introduction. section we review the existing research on (sequential) pooled auctions. section 3m formalized our model of simultaneous ooled suctions while in the section 4 we derive the equilibrium bidding strategies. Section 5 contains the revenue comparison for the case of identical objects and the expected revenue in the case of perfectly correlated objects.

Suggested Citation

  • Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K., 1996. "Simultaneous Ooled Auctions," Papers 302, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:302
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Juan Feng, 2008. "—Optimal Mechanism for Selling a Set of Commonly Ranked Objects," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 501-512, 05-06.
    3. Juan Feng, 2004. "Optimal Allocation Mechanisms When Bidders Ranking for the objects is common," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 545, Econometric Society.
    4. Salmon, Timothy C. & Iachini, Michael, 2007. "Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 67-85, October.
    5. Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
    6. Estrella Alonso & Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2015. "A parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated risk," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 141-160, February.
    7. Kfir Eliaz, 2003. "Creating competition out of thin air: Market thickening and right-to-choose auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000047, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Emiel Maasland, 2010. "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 286-298, June.
    9. Sander Renes, 2011. "Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-047/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Jonathan E. Alevy & Julianna Butler & Michael Price, 2016. "Multi-good Demand in Bidder's Choice Auctions: Experimental Evidence from the Lab and the Field," Working Papers 2016-01, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
    11. Yuen Leng Chow & Joseph T.L. Ooi, 2014. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 253-278, June.
    12. Burguet, Roberto, 2007. "Right to choose in oral auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 167-173, May.
    13. Eliaz, Kfir & Offerman, Theo & Schotter, Andrew, 2008. "Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 383-416, March.
    14. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General

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