Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists
A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple heterogeneous objects to multiple bidders with unit demand. Bidders submit bids for every object, and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get if they have the highest bid on more than one object. This type of auction has been used in the Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum. We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 166 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jacob K. Goeree & Charles R. Plott & John Wooders, 2004.
"Bidders' Choice Auctions: Raising Revenues Through the Right to Choose,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 504-515, 04/05.
- Goeree, Jacob & Plott, Charles & Wooders, John, 2003. "Bidders' choice auctions: Raising revenues through the right to choose," Working Papers 1181, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Salmon, Timothy C. & Iachini, Michael, 2007. "Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 67-85, October.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Offerman, Theo & Schotter, Andrew, 2008. "Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 383-416, March.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2010. "Do auctions select efficient firms?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(549), pages 1319-1344, December.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2007. "Do Auctions select Efficient Firms?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-001/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Roberto Burguet, 2005. "The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 73-90, April.
- Menezes, Flavio M & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 1998. "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 219-232, November.
- Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K., 1996. "Simultaneous Ooled Auctions," Papers 302, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
- Flavio Menezes & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1996. "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," Microeconomics 9611001, EconWPA.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2003. "Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-13, January.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1998. "Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Mark Armstrong, 2000. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 455-481.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
- Paul Klemperer, 2001. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Nov 2001.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-595, May.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
- Gabrielle Demange & Gale David & Marilda Sotomayor, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Post-Print halshs-00670982, HAL.
- Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 555-581, May.
- Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-479, June.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201006)166:2_286:spawmb_2.0.tx_2-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.