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Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and Its Applications

  • Emiel Maasland
  • Sander Onderstal

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10645-006-9025-y
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Article provided by Springer in its journal De Economist.

Volume (Year): 154 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 481-481

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Handle: RePEc:kap:decono:v:154:y:2006:i:3:p:481-481
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  49. Harstad, Ronald M., 1996. "Dominant Strategy Adoption, Efficiency, and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Discussion Paper Serie B 357, University of Bonn, Germany.
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