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Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors

Author

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  • Moldovanu, Benny
  • Sela, Aner

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1998. "Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors," Papers 98-21, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:13851
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers 20-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    2. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2016. "Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization," Discussion Papers 2016-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Aniruddha Bagchi, 2008. "Selling licences for a process innovation: the impact of the product market on the selling mechanism," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 1015-1045, August.
    4. Scarpatetti, Benedikt von & Wasser, Cédric, 2010. "Signaling in Auctions among Competitors," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 293, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Oleg Muratov, 2021. "Mapping an Information Design Game into an All-Pay Auction," Diskussionsschriften dp2102, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    6. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Emiel Maasland, 2010. "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 286-298, June.
    7. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2013. "Competition for procurement shares," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 193-208.
    8. Maasland, E., 2012. "Essays in auction theory," Other publications TiSEM 66fdb7ea-36e1-40d6-b6fd-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    10. Sumit Sarkar, 2005. "Patent Licensing By A Standard Auction In The Presence Of Network Externality," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 73(2), pages 228-245, March.
    11. Isabelle Brocas, 2013. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 359-387, September.
    12. Aniruddha Bagchi, 2008. "Selling licences for a process innovation: the impact of the product market on the selling mechanism," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(3), pages 1015-1045, August.
    13. Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, 2015. "Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 696-732, December.
    14. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    15. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2011. "On The Complete Information First-Price Auction And Its Intuitive Solution," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 353-361.
    16. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A. & Maasland, Emiel, 2011. "Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 594-601, June.
    17. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    18. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2019. "Dual sourcing with price discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 225-246.
    19. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2014. "Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 215-244, February.
    20. Jinshi Cheng & Bengang Gong & Bangyi Li, 2018. "Cooperation strategy of technology licensing based on evolutionary game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 268(1), pages 387-404, September.
    21. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible," Working Papers 2072/13264, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    22. Oleg Muratov, 2021. "All-Pay Auctions with Reserve Price and Bid Cap," Diskussionsschriften dp2106, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    23. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A., 2009. "Auctions, aftermarket competition, and risk attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 274-285, March.
    24. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Emiel Maasland, 2009. "Auctions with Flexible Entry Fees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-109/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    25. Akyol, Ethem, 2019. "Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 6-19.

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