Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
We study the existence of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible allocation procedures in a general setting with interdependent valuations. Possible applications include multi-object auctions and the provision of public goods. We emphasize the role of multidimensional signals, and, in view of applications, we allow for both informational and allocative externalties. The main result can exist only when private and social rates of information substitution are equal. This condition cannot be generically satisfied. We also discuss the one-dimensional case, and show that efficient implementation is there possible.
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|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1998|
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|Note:||Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank Eric Maskin for valuable comments.|
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- Gresik, Thomas A., 1991. "Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-63, October.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996.
"How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September.
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