Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Strausz, Roland, 2006.
"Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
- Roland Strausz, "undated". "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models," Papers 020, Departmental Working Papers.
- Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2019. "Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces," Papers 1910.12516, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
- Nicol'as Hern'andez Santib'a~nez & Dylan Possamai & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Papers 1701.05864, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
- Aloisio Pessoa_de_Araujo & Humberto L. Moreira, 2000. "Adverse Selection Problems without The Single Crossing Property," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1874, Econometric Society.
- Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2020. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Post-Print hal-01435460, HAL.
- Cai, W. & Singham, D.I., 2018. "A principal–agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(1), pages 239-256.
- Yu Chen, 2019. "Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 277-290, December.
- Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 1998.
"Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 473-502, November.
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Frank H. Page Jr., 1996. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms for Multiproduct Monopolists: Incentive Compatibility in the Presence of Budget Constraints," Microeconomics 9610002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- KLINGER MONTEIRO , Paulo & PAGE, Frank H. Jr., 1997. "Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists : incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2020. "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1023-1047, June.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/5371 is not listed on IDEAS
- Page Jr., Frank H., 1998.
"Existence of optimal auctions in general environments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
- Page Jr., F.H., 1997. "Existence of Optimal Auctions in General Environments," Discussion Paper 1997-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2020. "Bank Monitoring Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 988-1035, March.
- Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023. "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 375-416, August.
- Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2022. "Robust contracting in general contract spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 917-945, June.
- Carlier, G. & Dana, R.-A., 2005. "Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 826-843, November.
- Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Working Papers hal-01435460, HAL.
- Theilen, Bernd, 2003. "Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 283-289, May.
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