Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
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References listed on IDEAS
- Guesnerie, Roger & Picard, Pierre & Rey, Patrick, 1989.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Donze, Jocelyn & Gunnes, Trude, 2013.
"Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace,"
44769, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2013. "Becoming “We” Instead of “I”, Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace," Working Papers of BETA 2013-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2015. "Becoming “We” Instead of “I”, Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace," Working Papers of BETA 2015-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2013. "Becoming "We" instead of "I". Identity management and incentives in the workplace," Discussion Papers 760, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2006. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation: A Mixed Model of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2006-06, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
- Nicol'as Hern'andez Santib'a~nez & Dylan Possamai & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Papers 1701.05864, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2018.
- Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
- Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Working Papers hal-01435460, HAL.
- Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2012. "A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 161-190, March.
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