Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types
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- Tian, Guoqiang & Meng, Dawen, 2011. "Multi-task Incentive Contract and Performance Measurement with Multidimensional Types," MPRA Paper 41152, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMulti-task incentive model; Multidimensional mechanism design; Low-powered incentive; Missing incentive;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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