Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas
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- Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2010. "Incentive contracts for Natura 2000 implementation in forest areas," Post-Print hal-01072345, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nick Hanley & Simanti Banerjee & Gareth D. Lennox & Paul R. Armsworth, 2012.
"How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity?,"
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- Armsworth, Paul R & Banerjee, Simanti & Hanley, Nicholas & Lennox, Gareth D, 2012. "How should we incentivize private landowners to "produce" more biodive rsity?," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2012-02, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2015. "Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners’ willingness to accept," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
- repec:eee:forpol:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:3-13 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hily, Emeline & Garcia, Serge & Stenger, Anne & Tu, Gengyang, 2015. "Assessing the cost-effectiveness of a biodiversity conservation policy: A bio-econometric analysis of Natura 2000 contracts in forest," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-208.
More about this item
KeywordsAdverse selection; Conservation contracts; Forest; Incentives; Limited liability; Moral hazard; Natura 2000; Uncertain outcome; D82; Q23; Q57;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
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