Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x
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- Philippe Delacote & Charles Palmer & Ryiong Kim Bakkegaard & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, 2014. "Unveiling information on opportunity costs in REDD: Who obtains the surplus when policy objectives differ?," Post-Print hal-01024447, HAL.
- van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2017. "Forest carbon offsets and carbon emissions trading: Problems of contracting," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 83-88.
- Fortmann, Lea & Cordero-Salas, Paula & Sohngen, Brent & Brian, Roe, 2016.
"Incentive Contracts for Environmental Services and their Potential in REDD,"
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 9(3-4), pages 363-409, September.
- Fortmannm Lea & Salas, Paula Cordero & Sohngen, Brent & Roe, Brian, 2014. "Incentive contracts for environmental services and their potential in REDD," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6829, The World Bank.
- Rick Antle & Peter Bogetoft, 2018. "Procurement with Asymmetric Information About Fixed and Variable Costs," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1417-1452, December.
- Zhaoyang Liu & Jintao Xu & Xiaojun Yang & Qin Tu & Nick Hanley & Andreas Kontoleon, 2019. "Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions: Lessons from a Framed Field Experiment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 843-869, July.
- Susan Stratton Sayre, 2019. "Pay for the Option to Pay? The Impact of Improved Scientific Information on Payments for Ecosystem Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(2), pages 591-625, June.
- Prasenjit Banerjee & Rupayan Pal & Ada Wossink & James Asher, 2021. "Heterogeneity in Farmers’ Social Preferences and the Design of Green Payment Schemes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 201-226, February.
- Samuel D. Bell & Nadia A. Streletskaya, 2019. "The Random Quantity Mechanism: Laboratory and Field Tests of a Novel Cost-Revealing Procurement Mechanism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 899-921, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Payments for ecosystem services; Mechanism design; D82; H23; Q57;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
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