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Green payment programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs


  • Arguedas, C.
  • Meijerink, Gerdien W.
  • van Soest, Daan P.


Many conservation programs offer financial compensation to farmers in exchange for socially desired services, such as soil conservation or biodiversity protection. Realization of the conservation objective at minimum cost requires payments to just cover the extra costs incurred by each individual (type of) farmer. In the presence of information asymmetries regarding costs, incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but these typically only provide partial improvement because of several distortions. We argue that these distortions are inevitable only if all conservation costs are variable in nature. If there are fixed costs too, we find that the least-cost solution can be incentive compatible. We identify the exact conditions under which these maximum savings can be obtained and conclude that, given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation services provision, incentive—compatible contracts deserve a second look.

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  • Arguedas, C. & Meijerink, Gerdien W. & van Soest, Daan P., 2008. "Green payment programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44320, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae08:44320

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Andrew Moxey & Ben White & Adam Ozanne, 1999. "Efficient Contract Design for Agri-Environment Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 187-202.
    2. Tun Lin & Timo Goeschl, 2004. "Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices," Working Papers 2004.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Luca Di Corato, 2006. "Mechanism Design for Biodiversity Conservation in Developing Countries," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0034, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    4. Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
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    Asymmetric information; environmental benefits; mechanism design; Environmental Economics and Policy;

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