Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Actions or Both?
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More about this item
Keywordspayments for ecosystem services; principal-agent models; moral hazard; adverse selection; mechanism design;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2014-12-29 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2014-12-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2014-12-29 (Environmental Economics)
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