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The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

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  • Ian Mackenzie

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  • Nick Hanley
  • Tatiana Kornienko

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Suggested Citation

  • Ian Mackenzie & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 265-282, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:265-282
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9125-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002. "Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
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    8. Yates, Andrew J. & Cronshaw, Mark B., 2001. "Pollution Permit Markets with Intertemporal Trading and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 104-118, July.
    9. Jensen, Jesper & Rasmussen, Tobias N., 2000. "Allocation of CO2 Emissions Permits: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Policy Instruments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 111-136, September.
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    11. Paul Leiby & Jonathan Rubin, 2001. "Intertemporal Permit Trading for the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(3), pages 229-256, July.
    12. Parry, Ian W. H., 1997. "Environmental taxes and quotas in the presence of distorting taxes in factor markets," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-220, August.
    13. Kuik, Onno & Mulder, Machiel, 2004. "Emissions trading and competitiveness: pros and cons of relative and absolute schemes," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 737-745, April.
    14. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    15. Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November.
    16. Requate, Till & Unold, Wolfram, 2003. "Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 125-146, February.
    17. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
    18. Franciosi Robert & Isaac R. Mark & Pingry David E. & Reynolds Stanley S., 1993. "An Experimental Investigation of the Hahn-Noll Revenue Neutral Auction for Emissions Licenses," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-24, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:appene:v:204:y:2017:i:c:p:607-619 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Zhou, P. & Wang, M., 2016. "Carbon dioxide emissions allocation: A review," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 47-59.
    3. Hanley Nick & MacKenzie Ian A, 2010. "The Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, July.
    4. Du, Shaofu & Zhu, Lili & Liang, Liang & Ma, Fang, 2013. "Emission-dependent supply chain and environment-policy-making in the ‘cap-and-trade’ system," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 61-67.
    5. Jianqiao LIU & Gamal ATALLAH, "undated". "Tradable Permits Under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D," EcoMod2009 21500059, EcoMod.
    6. Knut Rosendahl & Halvor Storrøsten, 2011. "Emissions Trading with Updated Allocation: Effects on Entry/Exit and Distribution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 49(2), pages 243-261, June.
    7. Yuanguang Yu, 2012. "An Optimal Ad Valorem Tax/Subsidy with an Output-Based Refunded Emission Payment for Permits Auction in an Oligopoly Market," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 235-248, June.
    8. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Hanley, Nick & Kornienko, Tatiana, 2009. "Using contests to allocate pollution rights," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2798-2806, July.
    9. Liu, Liwei & Chen, Chuxiang & Zhao, Yufei & Zhao, Erdong, 2015. "China׳s carbon-emissions trading: Overview, challenges and future," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 254-266.
    10. Chang, Kai & Chang, Hao, 2016. "Cutting CO2 intensity targets of interprovincial emissions trading in China," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 211-221.
    11. Joschka Gerigk & Ian MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2015. "A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(1), pages 59-82, September.
    12. Andreas Leibbrandt & John Lynham, 2017. "Does the Allocation of Property Rights Matter in the Commons?," Monash Economics Working Papers 04-17, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    13. Robaina Alves, Margarita & Rodríguez, Miguel & Roseta-Palma, Catarina, 2011. "Sectoral and regional impacts of the European carbon market in Portugal," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2528-2541, May.
    14. Ben White & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 765-787, April.
    15. Ben White & Nick Hanley, 2014. "Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Actions or Both?," Discussion Papers in Environment and Development Economics 2014-08, University of St. Andrews, School of Geography and Sustainable Development.
    16. Sonia Schwartz, 2009. "Comment distribuer les quotas de pollution ?. Une revue de la littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(4), pages 535-568.
    17. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.
    18. Ian A. MacKenzie, & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/82, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    19. Zhou, P. & Zhang, L. & Zhou, D.Q. & Xia, W.J., 2013. "Modeling economic performance of interprovincial CO2 emission reduction quota trading in China," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1518-1528.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Relative performance; Initial allocation; Pollution permits; Auctions; Rank-order contests; Q53; Q58; C72;

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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