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A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content

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  • Ghosh, Arpita
  • Hummel, Patrick

Abstract

We investigate the widely-used rank-order mechanism for displaying user-generated content, where contributions are displayed on a webpage in decreasing order of their ratings, in a game-theoretic model where strategic contributors benefit from attention and have a cost to quality. We show that the lowest quality elicited by this rank-order mechanism in any mixed-strategy equilibrium becomes optimal as the available attention diverges. Additionally, these equilibrium qualities are higher, with probability tending to 1 in the limit of diverging attention, than those elicited by a more equitable proportional mechanism which distributes attention in proportion to the positive ratings a contribution receives, but the proportional mechanism elicits a greater number of contributions than the rank-order mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosh, Arpita & Hummel, Patrick, 2014. "A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 349-374.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:349-374
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Keith Burghardt & Emanuel F Alsina & Michelle Girvan & William Rand & Kristina Lerman, 2017. "The myopia of crowds: Cognitive load and collective evaluation of answers on Stack Exchange," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(3), pages 1-19, March.
    2. Yonghong Sun, 2023. "An economic analysis of different types of subsidies by UGC platforms," Information Technology and Management, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 221-231, September.
    3. Liangfei Qiu & Subodha Kumar, 2017. "Understanding Voluntary Knowledge Provision and Content Contribution Through a Social-Media-Based Prediction Market: A Field Experiment," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 529-546, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Attention economics; Game theory; Rank-order mechanisms; User-generated content;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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